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THESIS

NEGOTIATING PEACE WITH THE REFORM
THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT/SOLDIERS
OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE/YOUNG OFFICERS
UNION: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS

by

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June, 1995

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MOVEMENT/SOLDIERS OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE/YOUNG OFFICERS
UNION: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS

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ABSTRACT

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The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the crucial negotiating issues and positions to arrive at an educated estimate of what could derail the peace process and what could the government do about it. It will also attempt to determine the RAM/SFP/YOU intentions and probable courses of action during the peace process and to formulate the best possible courses of action the government panel may take in terms of issues to be raised, bargaining positions, negotiation procedures, and other related matters based on a set of negotiation guidelines. Lastly, the study will present possible scenarios anticipating the RAM/SFP/YOU likely courses of action and the recommended government countermoves.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Philippine history is replete with accounts of uprisings and rebellions triggered by tribal, religious, national and political discontent. After the last two decades of conflict, the Filipino people have suffered enough from the continuing armed and violent confrontations in many part of the country. Presently, there are three major rebel groups that are engaged in an armed struggle against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). The GRP is faced with dissent by; the ideological revolutionaries, the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NDF); the Muslim secessionists comprising the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); and the military rebels, the Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (RAM, formerly the Reform the Armed Forces Movement)/Kawal ng Sambayanang Pilipino (KSP, or Soldiers of the Filipino People)/Young Officers Union (YOU).

Upon the assumption of Fidel V. Ramos to the presidency in 1992, he emphasized that the advancement of peace and reconciliation shall be the priorities of his administration. From 1973 to 1992, the armed conflicts resulted to the death of 55,471 soldiers, government officials, rebels and innocent civilians. Some 1.5 million people have experienced displacement and have been deprived of their sources of livelihood; children who died of diseases, were orphaned, and deprived of education because of the figthing. Furthermore, the government has had to spend billions of pesos in operations to maintain peace and order throughout the country under an environment of armed internal conflicts. Perhaps, if only half of this amount could have been spent on development and livelihood programs, the Philippines might be in a much better state today. As the armed confrontations rage on,

attaining progress becomes an ever more difficult task. The Philippines will be doomed to poverty, and will forever be at the tailend of our fast-developing Asian neighbors.

President Ramos signed Executive Order 19 on September 1, 1992 creating the National Unification Commission (NUC) whose tasked was to "formulate and recommend, after consulting with the concerned sectors of society, to the President, a viable general amnesty and peace process that will lead to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the country." It is envisioned that the peace process will be aimed at peacefully resolving and ending the armed conflict, with neither blame nor surrender, but with dignity for all concerned.

This thesis will be centered on the peace negotiation between the GRP and the RAM/SFP/YOU. The study will analyze the crucial negotiation issues and positions to arrive at an educated estimate of what could derail the peace process and what the government, specifically the negotiating Team and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), could do about it. It will also attempt to determine the RAM/SFP/YOU intentions and probable courses of actions during the peace process and to formulate the best possible courses of action the government negotiating panel may take in terms of issues to be raised, bargaining positions, negotiation procedures, and other related matters based on a set of negotiation guidelines and framework. Lastly, the study would draw possible scenarios that may take place during the peace process and shortly thereafter, anticipating the RAM/SFP/YOU likely courses of action and recommended government countermoves in each scenario.

There is no doubt about the timeliness and usefulness of this study. Hopefully, this study will assist the government negotiating panel to have a better insight of the RAM/SFP/YOU position on basic issues it is expected to raise, its negotiating strategy and tactics, and the varied problems the

government panel may encounter during the entire peace process. The study then will give the government panel sound basis in the formulation of its position, counterissues and courses of action to be taken.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY

A. EARLY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS

In the remote past, there were crude military organizations. Their establishment came at a time when the early Filipinos bound themselves together and founded a system of community life. Filipinos lived in communities called barangays which they had to secure from external pressures. A barangay, a derivative of the Malayan word balangay meaning boat, consisted of tribal families numbering from thirty to one hundred.¹ The barangay was ruled by a headman called datu. Barangays due to socio-economic necessity merged to form a larger community either by mutual agreement among the datu or by force. The most powerful or influential headman assumed leadership to the enlarged community.

Archeological findings revealed a number of armaments and implements of war used by the early Filipinos. These consisted of crude stone arrowheads, cudgels, iron lances and stone and iron flints. The existence of these armaments indicates one conclusive fact; early Filipinos had an armed organization to protect themselves. The Filipino Muslims were the first to appreciate the importance of a strong military organization, and also the first to use a locally invented artillery piece called the lantaka.

¹ Agoncillo, Teodoro A. & Guerrero, Milagros C. - History of the Filipino, R.P. Garcia Publishing Company, Quezon City, 1973, pp. 45-46

B. RESISTANCE AGAINST SPANISH CONQUEST

1. The Battle of Mactan

The Spanish historian, Pigafetta, who accompanied Magellan in his epochal voyage, recorded March 16, 1521 as the date of discovery of the Philippines by the Spaniards.² In their haste to impose control on all the natives, the Spaniards burned a village in a neighboring island where the native chief, Lapu-lapu, refused to submit to Spanish domination. Lapu-lapu was the first Filipino to lead an organized resistance against the Spaniards.

When the Spaniards landed on Mactan Island, Lapu-lapu and his men despite limited weaponry as compared to the much better equipped Spanish forces under Magellan, were able to overwhelm them. At close quarters, the native warriors slashed the necks, elbows, and legs of the Spanish soldiers, killing many of them including Magellan.³

2. Early Filipino Revolts

Suppression of native ideas and activities had been the hallmark of the Spanish rule in the Philippines. As a consequence, the Filipinos became wholly dominated by their conquerors. The only exceptions were the native Filipino Muslims who were never conquered by Spanish arms. The Spanish colonial officials issued oppressive policies which aroused hatred and developed a rebellious spirit among the Filipinos. The series of revolts that followed were caused by: taxes, imposition of forced labor, abuses and corruption, and arrogance and racial discrimination showed by the Spaniards.⁴

² Dolan, Ronald - Philippines. A Country Study (4th Ed), Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993, p.5.

³ Karnow, Stanley - In Our Image. America's Empire in the Philippines. Random House, NY, 1989, pp.36-37.

⁴ Kessler, Richard J. - Suppression in the Philippines. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989, p.7.

The first of these revolts was led by Lakandula, the Chief of Tondo, and Soliman, his nephew and the Chief of Pasig against Legaspi in 1574. In their attempt to regain back the power they lost when the Spaniards landed in Manila in 1572, they attacked the Spanish garrison, the result of which was a devastating failure. Soliman's death during the fight ended the first Filipino revolt against Spain.

In 1621, Tamblot, a native priest or babaylan, rose to prominence when he led about 2,000 Boholanos in an uprising. He announced to the people of Bohol that "the time has come when they would throw off the oppression of the Castilians; for they were assured of the aid of their ancestors and deviates or gods".⁵ Another Filipino leader, Juan Sumuroy, rose to prominence in 1649 when he organized an army composed of natives of Samar. His uprising was the result of an order issued by the Governor requiring the conscription of labor from the Visayas to the Cavite shipyards. Also, in 1639, the Cagayan insurrection was brought about by the cruelty of Spanish officials and the oppressive practices of the Spanish soldiers.

C. THE SPANISH COLONIAL ARMY

During the entire Spanish regime, the Spaniards used Filipinos to fight for them in most, if not all, of their wars and campaigns in the island. Whether the enemy was a foreign force or Filipinos themselves, historical records reveal that there were always Filipinos on the side of the Spaniards.

In the barangays, the Filipinos lost their incentive to maintain their closely knit military organization. This was due to the fact that the security and protection of their communities had been wrested by the Spanish Army and the

⁵ Baclagon, Uldarico S. - Philippine Campaigns. Philippine Army Press, Makati, 1990, p.6.

Guardia Civil. This was prompted not by their loyalty to the Spanish throne, but by their wish to enjoy certain privileges such as, exemptions from forced labor and exemptions on the payment of taxes. However, when the Filipino revolts started to occur, some of them deserted to join the military rebels.

The Spaniards, due to their meager number of troops in the Philippines, were forced to employ Filipinos in their armed service and relieve themselves of military service. They organized Filipino companies, assigned company colors, and train them how to fight in the manner that the Spanish Army would conduct themselves. Their strength varies accordingly as to the demand of the situation.

During the final decades of Spanish rule, the Spanish military system was small and mixed. The army and navy forces utilized native Spaniards, other European nationals and Filipinos. The Guardia Civil, the infamous security police force which was organized in 1868, is a separate unit and is officered and manned by Spanish army regulars with some Europeans and a few Filipinos. These military forces were typical colonial armies serving colonial purposes: garrison duty, defense against foreign invaders, maintenance of peace and order, and detecting and suppressing insurrections.⁶

As the wave of nationalism in the 1890's began sweeping the country, the Spaniards, further distrusting the Filipino enlisted men, dropped the number of Filipinos on the service, while increasing the number of Spaniards.

D. THE RISE OF PHILIPPINE NATIONALISM

As early as 1892, the campaign for reforms spawned by the propaganda movement fomented several wealthy, patriotic Filipinos among whom were Dr. Jose Rizal, Pedro A. Paterno and

⁶ Jose, Ricardo Trota - The Philippine Army 1935-1942. Ateneo de Manila University Press, Quezon City, 1992, p.9.

Marcelo H. del Pilar; residing in Spain showed signs of failure.⁷ At the same time, a strong Filipino middle class was gradually emerging in the national scene. Only a few in this social structure held the conviction that the reforms prayed for could still be granted. The early Filipino leaders were not for separation from Spain. They were simply asking for reforms which were; changing the form of government from military to civilian, recalling the friars and the secularization of the parishes, representation of Filipinos at the Spanish Cortes, and equal treatment of the law before the courts of justice.⁸ In line with this thinking, the middle class, under the aegis of a strong-willed national leader, continued the struggle for a better colonial administration. This lasted until 1896.

1. The Katipunan

On July 7, 1892, Andres Bonifacio, a member of the working class, founded a revolutionary movement known as the Highest and Most Respectable Society of the Sons of the People (Kataastaasang Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan) or Katipunan.⁹ The fundamental objectives set forth were; to teach the ideals of patriotism and democracy, to foster the highest type of brotherhood among the members, and to promote chivalry and civic virtues for the glory of the Filipino race.¹⁰

⁷ Trask, David F. - The War with Spain in 1898. Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., NY, 1981, p.392.

⁸ Baclagon. op. cit., p.37.

⁹ Wright, Martin - Revolution in the Philippines. A Keessing's Special Report. St. James Press, Chicago, 1988, p.4; Linn, Brian McAllister - The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. University of North Carolina Press, 1987, p.4.

¹⁰ Zaide, Gregorio F. - History of the Katipunan. Loyal Press, Manila, 1939, p.4.

The Katipunan is difficult to evaluate as a conventional military force because it was an underground revolutionary movement. Organization into regular military units does not seem to have been done. Instead regional units, largely dependent on the commander were utilized. Officers and non-commissioned officers were appointed on the basis of how many men they brought with them and on their pre-revolutionary status.¹¹ There was no central headquarters and coordinated action was difficult to accomplish although war plans had made provisions for setting up such headquarters in Los Banos, Laguna.¹² Officers and men were all volunteers, at its peak, the Katipunan had some 30,000 men.¹³ Some of the officers had special skills which were utilized in building defense works or mobilizing men and materiel, but lack of tactical and strategic expertise, organization, discipline, training, as well as lack of arms and ammunition proved fatal. Bonifacio's men had to steal arms and ammunition from Spanish garrisons to augment their meager war assets. Their weaponry was mostly composed of sharpened bolos, spears, daggers and flints.¹⁴

In August 1896, the Katipunan was compromised when the secret society's plan were betrayed to government authorities. With the Spaniards searching for him, Bonifacio fled Manila and on August 22 he declared the "Cry of Balintawak", which marked the beginning of the Filipino revolt against Spain.¹⁵ While there were sympathetic outbreaks in the Tagalog regions, Bonifacio's call did not spark a national uprising. In the Ilocano and Bicol regions, the inhabitants, fearing

¹¹ Kessler. op. cit., p.10.

¹² Karnow. op. cit., p.73.

¹³ Agoncillo. op. cit., p.122.

¹⁴ Karnow. op. cit., p.73.

¹⁵ Ibid. p.74.

Tagalog tyranny, aided the Spaniards.¹⁶ Most of the Spanish troops were deployed against the Moslems in Mindanao, thus could not prevent the rebels from contesting the provinces in central and southern Luzon. The Spaniards and their Filipino auxiliaries, having sensed the lack of unity among the insurgent military forces caused by factional quarrels, took the offensive in 1897, and with better arms and disciplined soldiers, they recaptured most revolutionary province and drove the insurgents to the hills.

Bonifacio, unable to resolve the internal divisions and personality clashes in the movement, proved to be a poor field commander, and other military leaders soon emerged to challenge his authority. One of the most effective of these was Emilio Aguinaldo who gained prominence in August 1896 when he raided the Spanish barracks in Kawit, Cavite for guns and ammunition.¹⁷ When the revolt began, Aguinaldo formed a guerilla band, the Magdalo faction, assumed the title of general and soon controlled Cavite, the center of dissidence. Bonifacio, lacking military forces of his own, allied with the rival group, the Magdiwang faction. When the two factions agreed to merge during the Tejeros Convention held on March 22, 1897, Bonifacio was deposed as leader of the Katipunan. He refused to accept his demotion, and after an abortive coup, he was arrested, summarily tried and executed by the followers of Aguinaldo on May 1897.¹⁸ The members of the Magdalo and Magdiwang factions decided to dissolve the Katipunan and establish a republic, complete with an army. Aguinaldo proposed the formation of a republican government and the

¹⁶ Linn. op. cit., p.4.

¹⁷ Kessler. op. cit., p.10; Trask. op. cit., p.395; Bernstein, David - The Philippine Story. Farrow, Straus and Co. NY, 1947, p.6.

¹⁸ Kessler. op. cit., p.10; Trask. op. cit., p.93.

organization of a regular army; three corps of 10,000 men each, under the command of three generals and a general chief. Artemio Ricarte, former school master in Cavite, was elected captain general of the Filipino Army, a rank which corresponds to the present chief of staff.

While the Tejeros Convention is today credited by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the establishment date of the Philippine Army, it also marked a crucial and irreconcilable split between the Aguinaldo and Bonifacio factions which hastened the defeat of the Katipunan and the short lived Republic. The split of the movement enabled the Spaniards to regain the military initiative and trap the revolutionaries in the mountains where Aguinaldo would later offer to recognize Spanish rule under certain conditions. The Spanish authorities negotiated and concluded an armistice with Aguinaldo which was known as the "Pact of Biak-na-Bato". Among the provisions were the following:¹⁹

- a. Cessation of hostilities with the revolutionary leaders who agree to live in voluntary exile to Hongkong.
- b. Grant of general amnesty to those who would lay down their arms.
- c. Spain to pay an indemnity of 800,000 pesos to the uprising Filipinos and 900,000 pesos to Filipino families who had suffered as a consequence of the hostilities.

There was general peace in the country after the signing of the "Pact of Biak-na-Bato." Aguinaldo with 400,000 check in his possession, and the other revolutionary leaders boarded a vessel for Hongkong on December 27, 1897.

¹⁹ Ibid.

2. The Army of the Liberation of the Philippines

Among Aguinaldo's first acts upon returning from exile in May 19, 1898 was to rally Filipinos to the cause of independence. Learning from the mistakes of the Katipunan, Aguinaldo realized that an army had to be organized as soon as possible, that resources had to be maximized and leaders appointed. Due to the exigencies of that time, it had to be a volunteer army. It was called the Army of Liberation of the Philippines.²⁰

On June 23, 1898 Aguinaldo created a revolutionary government wherein he formed a department of War and Public Works, under which the army was placed, and the Department of Foreign Affairs, under which the navy was placed. Baldomero Aguinaldo was named secretary of war and public works and Antonio Luna, as director of war. The army was organized in conformity of the modern armies of that time. It was to have the standard military arms and branches: infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers and a general staff. The basic organization was regional and each province was under a provincial military commander. The provincial commanders were charged with the raising of army units and the subsistence and clothing of the troops. Because of this territorial mobilization of the forces, the units came to be known by the province they came from, such as "Cavite Battalion" or "Bulacan Battalion". The revolutionary government had no problem in acquiring any number of volunteers it wanted for military service. Due to the total absence of any roster or returns it was never ascertained how many Filipinos were actually mobilized.²¹

With the organization of the revolutionary army, acquisition of arms had to be addressed. On May 27, 1898 a shipment from Amoy arrived with 2,282 Remington rifles and

²⁰ Jose. op. cit., p.10.

²¹ Baclagon. op. cit., p.70.

176,550 cartridges.²² Consul General Rounseville Wildman, American consul in the Hongkong, made this purchase with 50,000 Mexican pesos provided by Aguinaldo. He also arranged for a second shipment, expending 67,000 pesos but it was never delivered to the insurgents; no one has ever explained the disposition of payment. The insurgents also sought arms in Japan but the vessel carrying these cargo encountered a violent typhoon off Formosa and went to bottom.

E. END OF INSURRECTION

1. The Capture of Aguinaldo

On March 23, 1901, Colonel Frederick Funston captured Aguinaldo by a daring ruse. Posing as prisoners, he and three of his officers were marched to Aguinaldo's headquarters in Palanan, Isabela, by a detachment of Macabebe scouts led by Cecilio Segismundo, masquerading as "insurrectos", and there arrested him. With the capture of Aguinaldo, the back of the insurrection had been broken, but much remained to be accomplished.

General Arthur MacArthur took drastic steps to curve out the insurrection. With infinite patience, he offered an olive branch and conveyed to the proud and sensitive Filipinos the fact that armed resistance was futile, but that generous mercy and a better life followed acquiescence. With this action, he became to the Filipino people a symbol of justice and fair play.²³ The Philippine Insurrection was ended by the presidential proclamation issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on July 4, 1901.²⁴ After two years of insurrection,

²² Trask. op. cit., p.405.

²³ Dupuy, Ernest R. (Col) - The Compact History of the United States Army. Hawthorn Books Inc. NY, 1964, p.174.

²⁴ Leckie, Robert - The Wars of America. Harper and Row Publishers, NY, 1968, p.574.

4,230 Americans died with hundreds more later dying of disease, and more than 20,000 Filipinos had perished.²⁵ President Roosevelt hereafter proclaimed peace, amnesty to all Filipinos taking the oath of allegiance, and the establishment of civil government throughout the Christian-inhabited portions of the country.

2. The Creation of the Philippine Constabulary

As early as November 30, 1900, the Second Philippine Commission headed by William H. Taft, who later became the First Civil Governor during the American colonial government, recommended to the Secretary of War, the organization of an Insular Constabulary.²⁶ The Secretary of War approved the organization of a national police corps as recommended, and Organic Act No. 175 entitled "An Act Providing for the Organization of an Insular Constabulary, and the Inspection of the Municipal Police Forces" was passed by the Commission on July 18, 1901.²⁷ The "Insular Constabulary" was later changed to "Philippine Constabulary" by virtue of Section 1 Act 255 on October 3, 1901.²⁸

Initially, the Insular Constabulary was composed and organized of the remnants of the Spanish Guardia Civil, established in 1898 from local levies to enforce the Spanish rule.²⁹ The Philippine Constabulary (PC) was initially

²⁵ Ibid. p.575.

²⁶ Ravenholt, Robert - The Philippines. A Young Republic on the Move. D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1962, p.56.

²⁷ Campos, Cicero C. - The Role of Police in the Philippines: A Case Study from the Third World. (Doctoral dissertation), University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1984, p.134.

²⁸ Ibid. p.132.

²⁹ Kessler. op. cit., p.111.

officered entirely by Americans and other Westerners until 1907.³⁰ It acquired a Filipino chief in 1917, and by 1933 nearly all its officers were Filipinos. The roles and functions of the PC centered on the maintenance of peace and order, law enforcement, and protection of lives and properties of the people.³¹ Added to this, they likewise performed other public service roles, acting as jail guards, postmasters, game wardens, and telegraph repairmen.³² It could be surmised that the prime purpose of the Constabulary was not military but police duty.

For the purpose of administering the PC affairs, the whole archipelago was divided into three districts. The number of districts was subsequently increased to five. Each district was under an assistant Chief of Constabulary who was vested with all the powers and prerogatives of the PC Chief. The initial recruitment and training of troops had no standard procedure. The troops had their training as they went about their usual business of chasing bandits and other lawless elements in the countryside.

After several years of operations, the PC carved out a distinguish record of performance as embodied in a favorable report of PC Chief Brig. Gen. Allen to Washington which stated among other things, that the Filipino constables were "unquestionably more efficient than the Americans".³³ The constables who demonstrated loyalty and deep devotion to duty were given the opportunity to qualify as officers of the PC. After qualifying in the entrance examinations, they are

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Campos. op. cit., p.142.

³² Dolan. op. cit., p.246.

³³ History of the Philippine Army 1897-1945. Army Historical Division, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Manila, 1981, p.66.

admitted to the PC School which was established in Sta. Lucia Barracks, Intramuros in 1905. After two years of study, they are qualified for call to active duty as commissioned officers. The opening of the school marked the beginning of the gradual "filipinization" of the Constabulary officer corps. In 1936 with the passage of the National Defense Act, the PC School rose to full college status and renamed Philippine Military Academy.³⁴ It offers an academic curriculum of four years leading to a degree of bachelor of science. Graduates are commissioned as second lieutenants in the regular force.

F. THE COMMONWEALTH PERIOD

1. The Tydings-McDuffie Act

In March 1934, the United States Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act which spelled out in formal terms the Philippine independence. The Philippines was to become a self-governing Commonwealth under American auspices for ten years before achieving total independence.³⁵ The outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 upset this calculation.

The decision to grant independence was among the early moves of the first administration of a Democrat President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The commonwealth would have its own constitution and would be self-governing, although foreign policy would still be the responsibility of the United States. Laws passed by the legislature concerning immigration, foreign trade and currency system needs approval of the President of the United States.³⁶ A constitutional convention meeting in Manila in 1934-1935 framed a government with an executive,

³⁴ Dolan. op. cit., p.263.

³⁵ Ravenholt. op. cit., p.63.

³⁶ Dolan. op. cit., p.39.

legislative and judicial structure and later, in 1940, the Commission of Elections was created as an independent body to supervise the electoral contests scheduled every two years.

Manuel L. Quezon was elected the first president of the Commonwealth. After his inauguration on November 15, 1935 he was faced with three basic problems, the solution of which would eventually lead to full political independence. These centered on political stability, national security and economy which had to be weaned away from American influence. He considered the problem of national security as an urgent one.

President Quezon in his first address to the National Assembly during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth said:

Our program for national defense must serve notice to the world that citizens of these islands are not to be subjugated; that the conquest of this nation cannot be accomplished short of destruction.³⁷

He anchored his stand that a truly independent republic which would be set up at the expiration of the ten-year commonwealth period would need a military organization to protect the State from both its internal and external threats. In view of this, Quezon requested the US Government to make available to the Commonwealth the services of General Douglas MacArthur, whose term as Chief of Staff of the US Army was soon to expire, as Military Adviser and Chief of the Philippine Military Mission composed of US Army officers. This request was formally considered in as much as a previous legislation had been amended which authorized the detail of US Army officers to the Philippines.³⁸ Immediately upon his arrival, Quezon conferred upon MacArthur the title of the

³⁷ Campos. op. cit., p.170.

³⁸ Smith, Robert Aura - Philippine Freedom 1946-1958. Columbia University Press, NY, 1958, p.101.

Field Marshall of the Army of the Philippines. Considering his dual status as an officer of both the United States Army and the Philippine Army, he retired from the US Army at the end of 1937 and continued in the service of the Philippine Army, only, until he was recalled to US Army duty on July 26, 1941.³⁹

2. The National Defense Act

MacArthur drafted a defense plan which Quezon presented to the National Assembly and it became law on December 21, 1935, known as Commonwealth Act No. 1 or the National Defense Act. The Philippine military would have two main components; the Regular and the Reserve Forces. The Regular Force would be made up of individuals who follow the profession of arms as a career, and who are constantly in the service of Government. The Reserve Force, on the other hand, would consist of those able-bodied male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and fifty who have been duly trained for military. The Defense Act provided for an annual draft of 40,000 men, so that by independence in 1946, there would be force of 400,000. They were to receive five and half month's training, after which they would go into a "citizen reserve," and be recalled at the end of five years for a refresher course. As envisaged by MacArthur, the defense plan was patterned after the citizen-soldier system of conscription effectively established in Switzerland.⁴⁰

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Shalom, Stephen Rosskam "The Implications of the Pre-War Philippine Experience for Peace Research", Journal for Peace Research, Vol.26, No.1, 1989, p.19.

On January 11, 1936, President Quezon through Executive Order 11 formally established the Philippine Army with the existing Philippine Constabulary as its nucleus.⁴¹ Jose de los Reyes, a retired colonel of the Philippine Constabulary was recalled to active duty and promoted to brigadier general and appointed as the first Acting Chief of Staff. Brig. Gen. Basilio Valdez and Col. Guillermo Francisco as the first and second Deputy Chief of Staff respectively.

The Philippine Constabulary Air Group which was activated on January 2, 1935, was redesignated as Philippine Air Force on July 3, 1947.⁴² In 1939, an Off-Shore Patrol (OSP) was organized as a unit of the Philippine Army. In October 1947, the OSP was renamed Philippine Naval Patrol and on January 5, 1951, it became the Philippine Navy.⁴³ On December 23, 1950, President Elpidio Quirino issued Executive Order No. 389 designating the four major services to compose the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Philippine Army (PA) became responsible for land defense, the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for air, the Philippine Navy (PN) for sea, and the Philippine Constabulary (PC) which, as the national police, was responsible for the security of rear areas in case of emergency.⁴⁴ Providing the command over the major services was General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines (GHQ, AFP). The Commander of the AFP was known as the Chief of Staff, AFP (CSAFP), who reported to the President as Commander-in-Chief.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Baclagon. op. cit., p.133.

⁴² Jose. op. cit., p.29,68.

⁴³ Dolan. op. cit., p.266.

⁴⁴ Executive Order No. 389 dated December 23, 1950.

⁴⁵ Dolan. op. cit., p.262.

The organization of the regular force, development of military camps and build up of the reserve force were pursued vigorously. For purposes of administration, training and mobilization of manpower and resources, the Philippine was formed into ten territorial groups, each designated as a Military District. At least one division was organized in each of the ten Military Districts into which the Philippines was divided under pertinent provisions of the National Defense Act. The head of the Military District was a district commander who was responsible for the coordination of all activities relative to the preparedness within his jurisdiction. In time of war, he was responsible for the defense of his district subject to the control of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.

The composition of the military districts, to include the reserve divisions assigned to them, was as follows:⁴⁶ The 1st Military District, under the 11th Division located at Baguio City, Mt. Province covered the areas Abra, Batanes, Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, Isabela and Mt. Province. The 2nd Military District under 21st Division at Tarlac, Tarlac covered La Union, Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan and Tarlac. The 3rd Military District under the 31st Division was based in San Fernando, Pampanga and covered Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga and Zambales. The 4th Military District covered Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Mindoro, Palawan and Rizal under the 41st Division located at Lipa, Batangas. The 5th Military District under the 51st Division was at Lucena, Quezon and covered Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Masbate, Sorsogon, Tayabas and sub-province of Catanduanes. The 6th Military District with the 61st Division covered Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Marinduque and Romblon. The 7th Military District under the

⁴⁶ Reports of MacArthur. The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific. Vol.1, Prepared by the General Staff, US Government Printing Office, Wash. DC, 1966, p.80.

71st Division stationed in Bacolod, Negros Occidental covered Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental and Siquijor. The 8th Military District covered Bohol and Cebu with the 81st Division based on Cebu, Cebu. The 9th Military District was at Tacloban, Leyte with the 91st Division which covered Leyte and Samar. The 10th Military District under the 101st Division located at Cagayan, Misamis Oriental covered agusan, Bukidnon, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Misamis Occidental, Misamis Oriental, Surigao, Sulu and Zamboanga.

3. The Philippine Scouts

The Philippine Scouts (PS) was first formed on September 4, 1899 in central Luzon to assist the US Army in its battles against Aguinaldo's forces.⁴⁷ The Filipinos composed the enlisted ranks and the officers were American regulars.⁴⁸ The Scouts, initially recruited as civilians, operated as guides, boatmen and occasionally fighters for the United States Volunteers.⁴⁹ At first, higher headquarters was hesitant to arm Filipinos, in particular Macabebes, fearing disloyalty from and revenge by other Filipino regional groups in Luzon.

The Macabebes comprised the first company of Philippine Scouts and were at first allowed to operate only within Pampanga. The "Macabebe Scouts" as they were initially called, was a tribe of blood thirsty mercenaries who had fought their brother Filipinos for Spain and now served America.⁵⁰ They played a key role in the capture of Aguinaldo by having

⁴⁷ Jose. op. cit., p.14.

⁴⁸ Buss, Claude A. - The United States and the Philippines. Background for Policy. American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, Wash. DC, 1977, p.6.

⁴⁹ Kredel, Fritz & Todd, Frederick P. - Soldier's of the American Army, 1775-1954. Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1954, unpaginated.

⁵⁰ Leckie. op. cit., p.573.

assisted the American troops led by Colonel Frederick Funston.

In February 1901 the United States Congress authorized President Theodore Roosevelt to enlist Filipinos in the United States Army.⁵¹ This act formally established the Philippine Scouts as a unit of the United States Army, following standard US Army Tables of Organization (TO) on company level and being paid as soldiers, but at levels below that of American servicemen. The rationale on this pay scale difference, wherein Filipinos received only half the pay of the regular American soldier was that Filipinos have a lower standard of living.

A great number of Filipinos from the different regions and tribes volunteered to join the scouts and by July 1, 1901, they totaled thirty four companies. These units were not under a single scout headquarters, and operated independently under regional field commanders. Although the scouts were officially listed as civilian employees and paid as such initially, they were de facto soldiers with khaki uniforms and Springfield rifles, who fought battles in the front lines.⁵² Like the Macabebe scouts, many of the volunteers had served in the Spanish colonial army and had already received some military training; several had feared reprisal from the revolutionary forces for having sided with the Spaniards, and had felt it safer and more practical to join the US Forces.

At the peak of the Filipino-American War, American soldiers reached a maximum of 71,528 in 1900.⁵³ The Scouts fought in Batangas, Souther Luzon, Jolo, Laguna, Leyte and Mindanao. Although guerilla warfare still raged in the hills, the announcement of the end of the war on July 4, 1902 and

⁵¹ Kredel & Todd. op. cit., unpaginated; Ravenholt. op. cit., p.66.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Jose. op. cit., p.15.

the return home of most of the US Volunteers lessened the need for military units in the Philippines.⁵⁴

Filipinos were given authority to study in West Point from 1908 on with one Filipino per class year, but the program then suffered from lack of interested and qualified applicants.⁵⁵ Also, a number of Filipino scout officers were allowed in the late 1920's to attend to some US Army service schools for further training and for career advancement.

G. UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE FAR EAST (USAFFE)

On July 26, 1941, General Douglas MacArthur was recalled to active duty and was appointed by President Roosevelt as Commanding General of all the United States Forces in the Far East (USAFFE).⁵⁶ Invoking the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, President Roosevelt also called to active service all the organized military forces to include the Scouts and the Constabulary of the Philippine Commonwealth and ordered to merged with the US Army under the command of General MacArthur.

When the national emergency developed, the training of reservist envisioned to form the "citizen army" was only half-way through in its implementation. By this time, the Philippine Army had in its roster of reservists no less than 160,000 troops from whom were mobilized the men to constitute the ten reserve divisions that were mustered into the service of the USAFFE. The USAFFE consisted of the Philippine Department, Regular Army (US); the Philippine Division, Regular Army (composed of the Philippine Scout regiments and the American 31st Infantry); and the Philippine reserve

⁵⁴ Leckie. op. cit., p.514.

⁵⁵ Dupuy. op. cit., p.176.

⁵⁶ Leckie. op. cit., p.737.

divisions.⁵⁷ Later at the outbreak of the war, the Philippine Constabulary and the rest of the regular force of the Philippine Army, were absorbed into the USAFFE. Altogether, the force available for the defense of the Philippines totaled around 110,000 troops of which 85,000 were in Luzon.⁵⁸

The induction of the Filipino forces commenced on August 15, 1941 with the Philippine Army Air Corps (PAAC) earned the distinction of being the first unit of the Philippine Army to be integrated to the USAFFE.

H. POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY

1. The AFP and the Huk Insurgency

The AFP, from its establishment until the early 1940's, was confined to its original functions of defending the state. But the absence of a viable and immediate external threat to the Philippines, the emergence of the Huk (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon or Hukbalahap, more commonly known as Huks) insurgency, the US defense umbrella in the Philippines and the larger Asian region led the AFP to assume a leading role in the peace and order drive of the country.

In the late 1940's, the rise of the Huk insurgency necessitated the expansion of the role of the AFP beyond its primary functions. The Huks originated as a peasant-based movement pressing for agrarian reform. They fought the Japanese during the latter's occupation of the country, the end of the war found them heavily-armed and well-organized. The government did not recognize them as guerillas hence they were excluded from receiving pensions and other benefits. The Huks criticized the government's failure to initiate land reform that would correct the inequitable land distribution.

⁵⁷ Baclagon. op. cit., p.134.

⁵⁸ Baclagon. op. cit., p.135.

The AFP embarked on an extensive campaign to defeat the Huks. However, the strategy was not confined to armed combat. During the tenure of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense, the strategy became a fusion of political, socio-economic, and military activities, thus signaling the start of the expansion of the military's protection, security, and peacekeeping functions. Magsaysay sought the assistance of Lt. Colonel Edward Lansdale, a military adviser attached to the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) and also head of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) clandestine and paramilitary operations in the country. In addressing the Huk problem, Magsaysay used two different approaches; a mailed-fist policy and a policy of attraction. A program of resettlement called Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), thought of even before World War II, was turned into reality by Magsaysay. It became the government's response to the "land to the landless" slogan of the Huks.

2. The AFP's Role in National Development

The AFP also conducted socio-economic activities such as the construction of roads, bridges, irrigation systems, school buildings and dams, in line with their counterinsurgency (COIN) program. When Magsaysay was elected President on December 1953, he continued the use of the military in the implementation of the socio-economic programs. During the incumbency of President Carlos Garcia after Magsaysay's death in 1957, the Socio-Economic Military Program (SEMP) was adopted as a military responsibility. It aimed to use the personnel and equipment resources of the military in food production, rural development, land resettlement and public works construction. A number of SEMP settlements were established in Mindanao, Luzon, and Panay Islands. However, this endeavor was not undertaken at full scale and permanent basis.

President Diosdado Macapagal did not believe that the military's role should be extended to involvement in civic action, unlike Magsaysay and Garcia. He terminated the AFP civic action programs arguing that civic action encouraged the military to engage in politics. By 1965, there had been a substantial reduction in the AFP's presence in national life. The soldiers returned back to barracks and the regularity of military life.

I. MARCOS AND THE MILITARY

1. The Military in Philippine politics: an overview

There is a consensus among students of post-war Philippine military, that up to 1972, the military establishment had not actively involved itself in Philippine politics and played an essentially non-political role.⁵⁹ The military was accustomed to being non-partisan subordinate of successive civilian governments. Even during the incumbency of Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense and President of the republic, military support did not translate into political action straining either the principle of civilian supremacy or the notion of military professionalism.⁶⁰ Civilian control over the military was effectively shared by congress and the president. While the latter, as Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, has primary control of the military operations, congressional control was also considerable. Congress defined military appropriations , passed on the promotions of officers to the rank of Colonel and above and conducted investigations when military

⁵⁹ Bresnan, John - Crisis in the Philippines. The Marcos Era and Beyond. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1986, p.134.

⁶⁰ May, RJ & Nemenzo, Francisco - The Philippines After Marcos. Croom Helm, London, 1985, p.91.

activities could be prejudicial to the public interest.⁶¹

With the election of Ferdinand Marcos as President in 1965 and up to the imposition of martial law, the military's traditional low profile and its non-participatory role in civilian functions changed. During this period, Marcos was instrumental in identifying roles for the military beyond the traditional ones of maintaining peace and order, defending the integrity of the national territory, and securing national sovereignty. He made the AFP an integral component of his economic development program. In his State of the Nation address, he emphasized that

...the primary threat to our national security within the immediate future lies in internal subversion rather than external aggression. The military establishment will be developed along this basic premise in the years to come. However, since the development of our economy provides the permanent solution to this threat, I intend to harness to a greater extent the resources of our defense establishment in our task of nation building. It will be culpable negligence on our part if the peaceful uses of the military forces were not availed of to the fullest extent possible in our continuing program of economic development.⁶²

The Four-Year Economic Program formulated in September 22, 1966 and approved by the National Economic Council noted that

...the AFP with its manpower, material and equipment resources plus its organizational cohesiveness and discipline possesses a tremendous potential to participate in economic development which should be exploited to the maximum. Such participation becomes imperative considering that

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² State of the Nation Address, Congress of the Philippines, January 22, 1968.

the problem besetting the country is socio-economic rather than military and that the resources available to solve this problem are scarce and limited.⁶³

The foregoing policy pronouncements provided the rationale for the AFP's massive participation in socio-economic development. On the basis of presidential delineations, the Philippine military was aptly described as a "catalyst of social change", a "training institution for national leaders", the "defender of the seat of government", a "nation builder", and a "model of national discipline and self-reliance".⁶⁴ Marcos reversed the trend toward professionalism in the AFP. During his first thirteen months in power, he also served as the secretary of national defense at which time he supervised the largest personnel shake-up in the AFP's history.⁶⁵ He reorganized the armed forces and rotated personnel to increase his personal control over the military.⁶⁶ Key officers in the AFP hierarchy were retired and replaced by officers from his home province of Ilocos Norte.

Southwest Command (SOWESCOM) was established on September 1968 to attend to the increasing criminal activities such as smuggling, cattle-rustling, and the conflict between the Christians and the Muslims in Southern Philippines. It became the first unified command in the AFP which was composed of elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Constabulary. On May 1, 1976, SOWESCOM became Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), with jurisdiction over the whole Southern Philippines and the responsibility of maintaining peace and order, assisting in

⁶³ Four-Year Economic Program 1966.

⁶⁴ May RJ & Nemenzo, Francisco. op. cit., p.92.

⁶⁵ Kessler. op. cit., p.116.

⁶⁶ Dolan. op. cit., p. 247; Kessler. op. cit., p.116.

the socio-economic development in the area, and guarding it from external and internal threats.⁶⁷

The Philippine Civic Action Group Vietnam (PHILCAG V) was the country's contribution to the Allied's efforts in the Vietnam conflict.⁶⁸ PHILCAG V was involved in the construction and repair of roads, bridges, buildings, in the resettlement of the refugees, and in attending to the sick and the wounded from both sides of the battlefield in Vietnam.

2. Martial Law Period

On September 21, 1972, President Marcos used his emergency powers to decree a state of full martial law throughout the country. In an address to the nation, Marcos explained his action on the grounds that "our democracy, is endangered by the peril of overthrow".⁶⁹ He further stressed that the government would now be able to undertake major drive against the communist insurgents and their supporters. Also at the same time, the government could implement the clean up of corrupt and sterile government officials, the initiation of land reform, the punishment of military personnel who had committed offenses against civilians and a radical reduction of the level of violence which had become endemic to Filipino society.⁷⁰ Marcos further clarified that the proclamation of martial law was not amilitary takeover. The military authorities would only be implementing martial law to protect the country.

Under martial law, the expansion of the military participation into civilian areas of operation was unprecedented in Philippine history. Military officials

⁶⁷ Dolan. op. cit., p.262.

⁶⁸ Dolan. op. cit., p.261; Kessler. op. cit., p.123.

⁶⁹ Wright. op. cit., p.10.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

assumed numerous previously civilian functions both on government and non-governmental organizations (NGO's).⁷¹ The record has moved a student of the Philippine military to remark:

...Under martial law, the military became the primary basis of regime support as well as the partner of the martial law regime in implementing governmental policies. Soon after the proclamation of martial law, congress was disbanded, political parties were proscribed, the media was controlled and civil liberties were curtailed. In a country where there was no militaristic tradition where the military was traditionally low keyed and had a low profile, the military became visible, performing an expanded security and law and order role, greater management and administrative and developmental roles, and a new political role.⁷²

The "new political role" of the military was further elaborated as:

...the most significant political role of the military since 1972 has to do with its replacement of the traditional politicians as dispensers of political patronage in the political system. Feeling the change in the distribution of political power, many petitioners transferred their locus of operations from the traditional politicians to the officer corps.

...a number of officers also act as officials of certain political subdivisions (towns, sub-provinces, etc.) where internal security is minimal. Like the military PROD's (Presidential Officers for Regional Development), they enjoy the executive and administrative powers within respective political subdivisions as well as political patronage and a political base.⁷³

⁷¹ Bresnan. op. cit., p.136.

⁷² May RJ & Nemenzo, F. op. cit., p.92

⁷³ Ibid.

Apart from external defense, the AFP was also charged with the suppression of rebellion and the enforcement of all laws, decrees, orders, and regulations issued by Marcos. The agrarian reform law, by virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, was also implemented by the military, in particular, the Philippine Constabulary. The PC Provincial Commanders were authorized to receive sworn statements of landowners and submit same to the Secretary of National Defense.

The military was also vested with judicial functions. The CSAFP was empowered to create military tribunals to try and decide cases of military personnel and other such cases as may be referred to them. These other cases included crimes against national security, violations of Anti-Subversion law and the laws of Espionage, crimes against public order, and crimes committed by public officials. By 1974, 20 military tribunals had been set up, however, on the later part of said year, Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 237 ordered the return of many cases from the military tribunals to civilian courts.

Peace and order problems continued to be the responsibility of the PC. In 1975, police forces were incorporated into the Integrated National Police (INP) and placed under the command of the PC Chief.⁷⁴ These efforts may be viewed as an attempt to centralize political control by taking away a very important power from local governments. Likewise, the security role of the Presidential Security Command (PSC), whose initial responsibility was the security of the President and Malacanang, was expanded. The PSC was involved in intelligence work, since its commander, General Fabian Ver, was also head of the National Intelligence Security Agency (NICA) which was responsible for supervision and coordination of all intelligence services.

⁷⁴ Dolan. op. cit., p.270.

AFP units in the region were also unified in a composite force and this gave birth to the Regional Unified Command (RUC) . The RUC's were composite units where the PA, PN, PAF, and the PC were integrated under one command to facilitate better coordination of combat and support operations. It was contended that such centralization would result in efficient disaster control and relief operations, and greater responsiveness in civic action programs.⁷⁵

The military's dual role as the guardian of our national sovereignty and its increasing participation in civilian government has been attended by rapid growth in manpower and an impressive increase in its final outlay. The AFP has a total strenght of 58,000 men in 1971, grew to 67,000 in 1975 and approximately 113,000 in 1982. Para-military forces are estimated at about 110,500. Reserve components of all services are reported to be about 124,000, bringing a total AFP strenght to 347,000 men. The national defense budget on the other hand, has increased from 367 million pesos in 1970 to 8,212 million pesos in 1983.⁷⁶

3. The Lifting of Martial Law

Martial law was lifted in January 1981 by virtue of Proclamation 2045. Substantively, nothing had changed. The military's martial law roles and the machinery for their effective pursuit remained intact. Military tribunals continued to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving subversion. The military contonued to implement presidential orders and decrees and went on with its law and order functions such as suppression of strikes, rallies and demonstrations. The role expansion of the AFP enhanced its capacity to intervene directly in the political affairs of the country. Marcos used the military to enforce his orders and

⁷⁵ Dolan. op. cit., p.200.

⁷⁶ May RJ & Nemenzo F. op. cit., pp.94-95.

decrees, and to perpetuate himself to power. He coddled his favorites in the military. Promotions and assignments continued to be his sole prerogative and personal loyalty became the primary criterion. Well-connected officers were able to place their people in key and juicy positions and even have their military services extended. The presence of extender officers effectively blocked the promotions of middle-grade officers.⁷⁷ Consequently, some officers became retirable at a fairly young age but at a fairly low ranks. A lot of officers were bypassed. A number of officers were promoted over several other more senior and qualified candidates. A breakdown in the merit system and demoralization became inevitable.

In the field, the men in combat suffered losses not only because of inadequate training and shortage of equipment and supplies, but also because of lack of troops.⁷⁸ The need for manpower resulted in mass enlistment and the transfer of men from desk job to combat. The concomitant result was that such troops fought against insurgents seasoned in guerilla warfare.

In August 1983, General Ver was implicated in the assassination of Benigno Aquino.⁷⁹ Marcos was forced to place Ver on a leave of absence while the investigation is going on. After being initially cleared by the Sandiganbayan, Ver immediately resumed his position as Chief of Staff.

The assassination unleashed massive popular opposition to the Marcos regime and the military organization that sustained it. Aquino's martyrdom united the people and gave them courage

⁷⁷ Kessler. op. cit., p.119; Dolan. op. cit., p.247.

⁷⁸ Staff Report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate. The Philippines: A Situation Report. November 1, 1985.

⁷⁹ Buss, Claude A - Cory Aquino and the People of the Philippines, Stanford Alumni Association, Stanford, CA., 1987, p.23: Kessler. op. cit., p.129.

to openly oppose the dictatorship. It became clear that the military leadership was a willing tool to perpetuate the regime at all costs.

Within the military, the assassination and the shame that attended it brought to fore latent dissatisfaction among some officers leading to the eventual movement of reform. The most prominent was the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). The RAM's original activities as stated in their Manifesto would be geared towards the attainment of the AFP's new thrust of uplifting the morale and welfare of every man and woman in uniform, enhancing the operational effectiveness of the military establishment, and restoring the people's faith in the armed forces.⁸⁰ The initial members were PMA classes of 1971 to 1984, but its membership expanded to include retired alumni who voiced out publicly their sentiments while many active officers signified their support quietly.

⁸⁰ Kessler. op. cit., p.128.

III. EMERGENCE OF THE REFORM THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT/SOLDIERS OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE/YOUNG OFFICERS UNION (RAM/SFP/YOU) .

The assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. on August 21, 1983, triggered the severest political and economic crisis in the history of the Philippine republic. The immediate reaction was to demand the resignation of President Marcos. The assemblymen from the opposition party signed a resolution calling for the impeachment of Marcos on charges of "graft and corruption, culpable violation of the constitution, gross violation of his oath of office and other crimes." ⁸¹ This was just brushed aside by Marcos and thrown out by the court. The United States since the murder of Aquino increasingly pressured Marcos to implement sweeping reforms to combat insurgency, rehabilitate the economy and restore democratic institutions.

A. THE REFORM THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT (RAM)

The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) started out as a loose group of military officers. Initially they were fondly referred as the Wednesday Club and later became the Thursday Club. These gatherings later turned into gripe sessions and eventually expanded to a larger group. On July 23, 1982, the REFORM (Restore Ethics, Fairmindedness, Order, Righteousness and Morale) the Armed Forces of the Philippines was born.⁸² The organization of the RAM was a reaction to the widespread corruption in the ranks, favoritism in farming out promotions, babying of long retireable generals which stunted their own

⁸¹ Sacerdoti, Guy "Thrown out of control", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 22, 1985, p.13.

⁸² Arillo, Cecilio T. - Breakaway. The Inside Story of the Four-Day Revolution in the Philippines. February 22-25, 1986. CTA and Associates, Kyodo Printing Co. Inc., Manila, Philippines, 1986, p.166.

career, rampant abuses against civilians, discrimination in the use of supplies, and the use of military units and paramilitary units to thwart the national will of the during elections.⁸³

The founding members of the movement were Brig. Gen. Eugene Ocampo, Colonel Gregorio Honasan, Colonel Victor Batac and Lt. Diosdado Valeroso to name a few.⁸⁴ During the next couple of years, the RAM established linkages with other units in the armed forces through the conduct of information campaigns and informal talks to the officers and men in its effort to expand its membership. It grew to an estimated strength of 1,500 officers of a total 13,000-man officer corps.⁸⁵ Majority of the movement's members were PMA graduates from the class of 1971 through the present.⁸⁶

Other groups nationwide were organized to spread the gospel of reforms until a ripple effect was achieved. RAM members traveled to the different military units of all the provinces and dialogued with any number of their comrade in arms who cared to listen. Each time they completed their mission, they received positive reports especially from among the junior officers, indicating the success of the movement. The task was formidable considering that the training of soldiers compels them "to obey first and complain later". The reformists found some difficulty to make their target audience, the rank and file, make them understand the nation they were defending with their lives was moving to an undesirable direction, and that they were being used to

⁸³ Dolan. op. cit., p.249.

⁸⁴ Arillo. op. cit., p.166.

⁸⁵ Tasker, Rodney "The Hidden Hand", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 1,1985, p.10.

⁸⁶ Tasker. op. cit., p.11.

promote personal rather than national interest. Added to this, a search for leaders of the small group was launched from among the more senior, only to find out from them a common reticence to lead. They were either too high to be non-partisan, too comfortable to be interested, or too wealthy to care.

On February 17, 1985, the RAM came out with its preliminary statement of aspirations embodying their ideals and later on March 15, 1985 a statement of common aspirations which lay the movement's reformist guidelines in seeking an "effective and efficient and fairminded armed forces in the service of country and people."⁸⁷ The RAM basic aim was to establish a unique martial tradition for the nation which envisages that "in the event that the movement is compelled to intervene in the political life of the nation in order to save it, the members pledge to each other that they shall return to barracks as soon as the sovereign will of the people has prevailed." The movement sought measures to prevent rifts in the AFP, weed out corrupt and banish "undesirables". One major gripe of the reformists was the bad image given to the military by "undesirable" officers and men who carried out abuses among the civilian population, misused equipment for their own personal needs, used their position for financial gain and take part in criminal activities.⁸⁸ It also wanted to improve training, education, equipment and more efficient dispersement of logistical supplies to troops in the field. Promotions and rewards should solely be on the basis of merit. The overall sum was to improve the morale of a military which had become largely alienated from the people, particularly in the combat areas.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Tasker, Rodney "Power to the Reformer", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 1, 1985, p.12.

The first public appearance of the RAM was on March 21, 1985, at the Philippine Military Alumni homecoming day in Baguio City which coincided with the Academy's graduation exercises for Class 1985, wherein 300 members demonstrated in front of the graduating class and guests, including President Marcos, who was the traditional keynote speaker at the commencement rites and other senior officers of the AFP hierarchy. The Reformists sported T-shirts with the legend "We Belong..." (short for the group's name- We belong to the Reform the Armed Forces Movement), and waved banners and placards demanding reform in the military organization.⁸⁹ The reforms they asked for were focused on the military establishment only. Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Acting Chief of Staff Lt. Gen Fidel Ramos publicly endorsed the movement. A number of retired generals, including former chiefs of staff have since indicated their support.⁹⁰ The Association of Generals and Flag Officers (AGFO) issued a statement signed by retired Brig. Gen. Albert Friedlander saying its members "appreciate and support the We Belong movement and express our deep admiration and commendation to this highly patriotic act."⁹¹ The core leaders of the Movement were military academy graduates. A study of PMA graduates before 1972 revealed that cadets were more tolerant of political and social diversity, less conservative than other students, and even became less authoritative as they progressed in their academy life.⁹² These findings suggest at least one reason the graduates became leaders of the military reform movement because they were more attuned to social development. This can

⁸⁹ Arillo. op. cit., p.166.

⁹⁰ Buss. op. cit., p.91; Staff Report. op. cit., p.8.

⁹¹ Tasker. op. cit., p.11.

⁹² Kessler. op. cit., p.129.

also be the result of only having a single academy were all cadets were trained to be with the army, navy air force and the constabulary (in 1991, Philippine National Police Academy was organized and presently conducts the training of constabulary/police officers), wherein graduates have developed a common bond and understanding, common ideals and aspirations, and common goals and objectives and that is love of god, duty and country. The common experiences and personal loyalties gave the movement an organizational cohesion although it lacked in numerical strenght as against those allied to Marcos.

The Philippines being closely allied with the United States was closely monitored by the latter. The reform movement was actively encouraged by Pentagon in its growth. This was manifested when it was praised during the congressional hearing/testimony in 1985. The support of the United States is valuable to the cause of the movement. The RAM knew that to stage a successful overthrow of the Marcos regime, support not in terms of arms and munitions, but the need of US moral support and backing. there were already plans as early in the late of 1985 to overthrow Marcos, even if his eventual death was necessary. It was during this period that the Army organized a 600-man counter-coup force and threatened to arrest the members of the RAM movement.⁹³ However, RAM's timetable was hastened when Marcos decided to call for a snap presidential election.

If the RAM should succeed in its reformist mission, the AFP would be a more acceptable guardian of the people. If it managed to achieve its second more dangerous goal of safeguarding a democratic transition of power after Marcos, the AFP would have earned itself a permanent position on the Philippines political landscape.

⁹³ Tasker. op. cit., p.11; Staff Report. op. cit., p.13.

B. SNAP PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

After two years of political and economic crisis, growing communist insurgency and pressure from allies, Marcos decided to put his 20-year old regime at risk by calling for a "snap" presidential election to be held on February 1986, in order to attain legitimacy and to strengthen his hold to the presidency. Marcos used the communist issue as his main campaign weapon, despite captured documents of the Communist Party of the Philippines plenum held on December 23, 1985 in Nueva Ecija revealed that the communist insurgents would boycott the elections.⁹⁴ The communist strategy was to allow the election to go ahead, and assuming Marcos wins or forces himself to win, to prove to the opposition the futility of fighting Marcos via the election box.

The role of the AFP in the polls was a crucial factor. The reaction of the military officers to the election result would be equally and perhaps ominously significant. Marcos' critics accused him of making the AFP his private army. He has gradually enhanced the armed forces status as a political force, and at the same time military officers became factionalized.

RAM launched, as its first major activity, the "Kamalayan'86" (or Consciousness '86) campaign for a clean, orderly, peaceful, and honest elections during the February 1986 snap presidential elections. "Kamalayan" was conceived by Navy Captain Felix Turingan to mount a major information drive calling for public vigilance against election fraud and coercion. The Movement which then claimed 70% of the commissioned officers since 1972, intended to communicate to active servicemen the necessity of not interfering with the election process. Its objectives were to build public

⁹⁴ Sacerdoti, Guy "True Cost of Defeat", Far Eastern Economic Review, February 6, 1986, p.24.

understanding of election issues, maximize voter registration and to urge people not to sell their votes.⁹⁵ Among the planned activities were a series of prayer seminars around the country on the issues of the campaign and the conduct of the election.⁹⁶

The election was held on February 7, 1986. President Marcos had as his running mate a veteran politician, a traditionalist, and an expert in the constitution, Senator Arturo Tolentino. The opposition on the other hand formed a coalition party and named as their standard bearer, Corazon Aquino, widow of the late Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. Her running mate was the former Senator Salvador Laurel, also a member of the old Congress, a traditional politician who came from a political clan and whose father was the late President Jose Laurel. Members of the US Congress led by Senator Richard Lugar came to Manila to observe the election process.

The results of the election "officially" showed that Marcos-Tolentino tandem won over the Aquino-Laurel team. The Aquino-Laurel ticket garnered more votes in the urban areas but when the votes from the different barrios and barangays came in, the Marcos-Tolentino ticket overcame such deficit and won by a small margin. However, based on the civilian-managed poll tally, the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) which was pro-Aquino, showed the results otherwise. It was claimed that the people of Marcos manipulated some of the election returns from selected provinces all over the country. Election frauds and coercion were raised by the opposition against Marcos. Vote-buying and ballot snatching were the other issues exposed. Senator Lugar confirmed in his after

⁹⁵ Sacerdoti, Guy "A Question of Fairness", Far Eastern Economic Review, January 30, 1986, p.11.

⁹⁶ Youngblood, Robert "The Corazon Aquino Miracle and the Philippine Churches", Asian Survey, Vol. XXVII, No. 12, December 1987, p.1246; Karnow. op. cit., p.43.

mission report to President Ronald Reagan that there were indeed election anomalies largely initiated by Marcos' party.⁹⁷ He concluded that the election was tainted with fraud and that Marcos did not have the clear mandate of the people.⁹⁸

Prior to the official proclamation of the winners of the recently concluded presidential election by Congress, on February 22, 1986, RAM leaders precipitated the revolt against Marcos. Defense Minister Enrile and LtGen. Ramos led the disintegration of military support for Marcos.

C. THE PEOPLE'S POWER (EDSA) REVOLUTION

The so-called EDSA (acronym of Efifanio De Los Santos Avenue) Revolution lasted for four days of which the RAM led by Minister Enrile and LtGen Ramos and supported by the people's power and the Clergy resulted in the non-violent overthrow of Marcos. Initially, the plotters envisioned the formation of a junta composed of the cross-section of society which represented the labor, business, clergy, judiciary, military and the professional sectors to run the country until such time new elections could be held.⁹⁹ Mrs. Aquino then had the support of an extraordinary coalition of forces ascended to the presidency. Never in the history of the Philippines that a lady president ruled the country and this was the first time that it happened. She had the support of NAMFREL, which was led by business executives and the Catholic clergy. It is worth to mention the critical role played by the

⁹⁷ Staff Report. op. cit., p.16; Sacerdoti & Tasker "Marcos Countdown", Far Eastern Economic Review, February 27, 1986, p.10.

⁹⁸ Buss. op. cit., p.35.

⁹⁹ Van der Kroef, Justus M "Aquino's Philippines. The Deepening Security Crisis", Conflict Studies, The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1988, p.2.

clergy during the four-day revolution. Led by Jaime Cardinal Sin, the archbishop of Manila, as a body the bishops called on the people to demonstrate their rejection of the official election count by engaging in non-violent disobedience.¹⁰⁰ A total of 400,000 volunteers were mobilized to police the voting during the snap elections and found the official count in favor of Marcos patently and massively fraudulent.¹⁰¹ The massive support for Mrs. Aquino was an indication of the confidence the Filipino people bestowed upon her.

The RAM's role in EDSA in restoring democracy was seen in the positive light and enabled the military to gain legitimacy in the public eye. The people thought of the military before as the unwitting tool of Marcos and are controlled through the chain of command. The evidence appeared that the Filipino soldier also had some ideals and given the opportunity to express such ideals and aspirations, would follow the dictates of his own conscience. Thus, the action taken by some members of the military seeking reforms in government eventually caused Marcos's overthrow and ushered in a new era for the military in the Philippine society.

D. THE AQUINO REGIME (1986-1992)

The Aquino administration embarked on a national goal of national reconciliation and unification. To start with, she and her cabinet and advisers set the task of political reconstitution, she disbanded key elements of the Marcos machine, including the Office of Media Affairs, the Presidential Security Command and the National Intelligence Security Authority.¹⁰² She retired extended generals and

¹⁰⁰ Youngblood. op. cit., p.1241.

¹⁰¹ Hernandez, Carolina "Reconstituting the Political Order", Crisis in the Philippines, 1986, p.176.

¹⁰² Hernandez. op. cit., p.177.

other senior officers perceived to be Marcos loyalists were dismissed.¹⁰³ Also, to meet her campaign pledge, she released all political prisoners, including founders of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and of its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA).¹⁰⁴

The military had also started its reforms. The new CSAFP, Gen. Ramos undertook a series of internal reforms designed to professionalize the renamed New Armed Forces of the Philippines, NAFP (after one year, the military reverted back to its former name AFP). Military personnel assigned to positions outside the military were recalled, thus reducing the armed forces involvement in government.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution permanently bars retirement extensions, military service in civilian positions and the involvement of military personnel in politics. In response to the President's call for national reconciliation and unification, the armed forces revised its counterinsurgency concept and formulated a strategy under Letter of Instruction MAMAMAYAN (Pro-People).¹⁰⁵ The strategy called for an holistic approach in defeating insurgency, unlike during Marcos when the military solely was tasked to combat this threat. The military's role is to fight the armed component of the CPP while the other government agencies attend to the relocation and rehabilitation of rebel returnees. In essence, the military returned to their basic role of protector of the people and defender of the sovereignty of the state.

¹⁰³ Kessler. op. cit., p.132; Dolan. op. cit., p.250; Hernandez. op. cit., p.178.

¹⁰⁴ Hernandez. op. cit., p.178.

¹⁰⁵ Buss. op. cit., p.67; Dolan. op. cit., p.254.

1. Military Threats to Redemocratization

The administration of Corazon Aquino, which RAM helped put into power, failed to institute the reforms it promised to deliver, thus military elements repeatedly rebelled. The military's commitment to civilian authority has always been questionable and has become more so given its profound involvement in government and economy during the martial law years. Aquino saw the military as a threat in her presidency. In her six years of governance, seven coups had been initiated but failed. RAM continued its struggle for social change through two major uprisings, the August 1987 and the December 1989 coup d'etats. As early as July 1986, there were already growing controversies that surfaced between the government and the defense and military establishments. Enrile was against the release of the core leaders of the communist party. He maintained the principle that Jose Ma. Sison, the founder of the party, and his followers were not merely political dissenters but more so of being hard core ideologues. But due to Aquino's campaign pledge, and without taking into account the repercussions of such political move and also in the point of view of national security, all political detainees were released. Another facet of controversy was the appointment of left-leaning members of the Cabinet, such as Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, Secretary Pimentel and Secretary Sanchez.¹⁰⁶ The defense and military officials viewed this as a threat which might undermine their positions.

Another controversial issue was the duration of the government initiated ceasefire with the CPP/NPA. Enrile demanded that there should be a specific time frame of the peace talks with the CPP/NPA and a definite duration of the ceasefire. The defense and military establishments wanted a

¹⁰⁶ Clad, James "Rumours in a Hothouse", Far Eastern Economic Review, November 20, 1986, p.6.

short duration of the ceasefire and not six months as decided by Aquino. President Aquino still being critical to the military seemed to be lenient in dealing with the communists. The military pictured themselves fighting insurgency with their right hands tied behind their backs and only using the left to combat the insurgents. The insurgents were more benefitted in the reconciliation approach by Aquino because it gave them the opportune time to regroup and to rearm.

During the period September to November 1986, there was a plot code named "God Save the Queen" aimed at eliminating the pro-communists members in government and having a Convenor Group to govern the country.¹⁰⁷ The plotters believed that Aquino was a weak president. Her only qualification to power was the support of the people and the clergy and the symbol of bringing back freedom and democracy to the people. It was clear that Enrile was closely connected with the plotters. This plan was aborted when Aquino forced Enrile to resign as Minister of Defense after her military supporters informed her this report and could no longer ignore them. This marked also the break-up of the Enrile-Ramos faction. Ramos denounced the impending coup and directed all members of the armed forces not to support the plot.¹⁰⁸ Retired General Rafael Ileta replaced Enrile as Minister of Defense.¹⁰⁹

With the support of the AFP-led group of Ramos to the administration, Ramos and his generals then demanded certain reforms. They requested the resignation of cabinet members who were perceived to be corrupt or leftist and the setting of a

¹⁰⁷ Komizar, Lucy CA. The Story of a Revolution. George Brazier Inc. NY, 1987, p.214.

¹⁰⁸ Burton, Sandra "Aquino's Philippines. The Center Holds", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 3, 1987, p.531; Wright. op. cit., p.34.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid; Kessler. op. cit., p.133.

firm deadline for the conclusion of Aquino's talks with the Communist Party.

2. RAM-led Coups

The Reformist group had expressed dissatisfaction in the manner the Aquino administration was dealing with the communist movement. Aquino and her advisers did not have an effective counterinsurgency program and claimed that their political incompetence led to the growth of the NPA. There was no political will to institute government and military reforms in order to strengthen national interests. Along this perception, the RAM developed its belief to intervene in the nation's political life. On August 28, 1987, Honasan led hundreds of troops in attacks on television stations, Villamor Air Base and the Malacanang Palace. The palace assault failed, and the rebel forces eventually rallied at Camp Aguinaldo where they seized the Armed Forces General Headquarters. In other parts of the country, military rebels also seized several military camps principally in Cebu, Bicol and the Philippine Military Academy. The coup collapsed after the first day. Honasan, with some followers managed to escape when the government troops reoccupied the camp and went underground. Many observers believed the coup came close to success. Honasan, at that time, remained at large, giving press interviews and moving freely until his capture in December 1987. The government court-martialed and sentenced several officers to lengthy prison terms.

The Reformists complained that the Aquino government was critical of the military and unfairly lenient toward the communists. They further called for reform of the government and the military and for a more effective counterinsurgency program. A poll of military officers prior to the August coup attempt showed broad support for RAM's grievances and

substantial support for its tactics.¹¹⁰ Following the coup, the government responded to some military complaints by improving military pay and benefits, including housing for all ranks. The United States accelerated arms shipments at the government's request. Several retired military officers were given government positions, and finally, Aquino announced a hard line approach to the insurgency.¹¹¹ With these actions, the government expected to erode the base support of the coup makers within the military thus reducing the chances of future military plots against the government to succeed.

Meanwhile, the Young Officers Union (YOU) was launched by a cluster of lieutenants and captains on August 8, 1988.¹¹² Its beginnings are still somewhat obscure and tend to overlap with the RAM, but analysts believed many of these young officers, initially from PMA class 1978 to 1981, provided the jump start that allowed RAM to make its move against Marcos. Colonel Honasan contended that the group had evolved from a mere cadre of RAM into a nationwide network. These young officers during the 1986 People's Power revolution acted as messengers and watchers and to some extent made the coffee for senior officers.

In 1990, the YOU, an impatient alliance of self-styled nationalists, appeared to have taken the baton from the RAM as the rebellious wave of the future in the Philippine military. Unlike RAM, it is a shadowy cellular organization whose leadership core is believed to comprise a collection of junior intelligence officers using the experience they gained in the underground war against the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Among them are Scout Rangers Major Abraham

¹¹⁰ Dolan. op. cit., p.251.

¹¹¹ Kessler. op. cit., p.132; Dolan. op. cit., p.251.

¹¹² MacBeth, John "Who are YOU?", Far Eastern Economic Review, June 7, 1990, p.6.

Purugganan and Captain Danilo Lim. Other significant players in the formation of the group are Captain Diosdado Valeroso, Captain Albert Yen and Lieutenant Pajarillo. However, YOU's structural leadership is not well-defined and remains largely unknown.¹¹³

Although then AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Renato de Villa and other senior officials tend to playdown YOU's significance, Philippine and Western intelligence sources are taking it seriously. In a congressional testimony, United States deputy assistant secretary of defense, Carl Ford, acknowledged that YOU had played "an important role" in last December 1989 coup attempt, which came close to toppling President Corazon Aquino.¹¹⁴ In 1989, RAM allied itself with the YOU and the Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP), a group of Marcos loyalists led by Brig.Gen. Jose Zumel; and evolved into a revolutionary organization. Thus the new name, Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa or Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance. The group initiated the bloody coup attempt on December 1, 1989. They launched a series of attacks in Manila and seized a major air base in Cebu. Elite marines and army scout ranger units held parts of the army and air force headquarters and the Manila International Airport before moving to Camp Aguinaldo. Although the attack at the Armed Forces General Headquarters failed inspite of aerial bombardments by the rebels, the rebels seized part of the Makati's financial district. In a show of support to President Aquino, United States Air Force F-4's from Clark Air Base conducted "persuasion flights" over the rebel bases, which

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ MacBeth. op. cit., p.25.

later became the turning point of the revolt.¹¹⁵ The Makati seige ended on December 7, 1989 with the negotiated surrender of the scout rangers and the Cebu rebellion collapsed two days later. Nearly 100 people died in the fighting, and more than 600 were injured.¹¹⁶

Aquino formed a commission to look into the grievances aired by the military rebels. The commission was headed by Hilario Davide with four other members; Ricardo Romulo, Delfin Lazaro, Christian Monsod and Carolina Hernandez.¹¹⁷ After a year-long investigation and personal visits to field units and the conduct of personal interviews to the officers and enlisted personnel, the Davide Commission revealed that all the grievances of the military were all legitimate. The low pay and allowances, graft and corruption in the military and in government, the lack of individual clothing and equipment issued to personnel assigned in the field, inadequacy of military housings, inadequate medical and dental care facilities and a weak counterinsurgency policy of government were some of the issues raised by the soldiers. The commission further surmised that there was also a hidden agenda in all these military adventurisms by the reformists and that the desire to attain power and personal interests.¹¹⁸

RAM leaders lived underground while their followers who were captured and detained were facing court martial proceedings. Aquino ordered the dismissal from the service of all RAM leaders in the underground and officers who were

¹¹⁵ Nagara, Bunn "The Revolt in the Philippines", Asian Defence Journal, February 1990, p.10; Kessler. op. cit., p.251.

¹¹⁶ Dolan. op. cit., p.251.

¹¹⁷ MacBeth, John "A Common Thread", Far Eastern Economic Review, October 18, 1990, p.22.

¹¹⁸ Ibid; Dolan. op. cit., p.252.

directly involved in the coup. She directed the military to conduct internal reforms and requested Congress to increase the AFP budget in order to improve the economic well-being of the soldiers and their families.

E. THE ELECTION OF RAMOS AS PRESIDENT

In June 1992, a presidential election was held as the six-year tenure of President Aquino came to end. Fidel V. Ramos, who was anointed by Aquino as her candidate, won this bitterly contested electoral process. He won over five other presidential candidates by a slim majority. The electoral process exemplified the support of the people to democracy and the presence of many political parties indicated the return of the freedom of expression once suppressed during the Marcos regime. The Government had achieved legitimacy having massive popular support in the election. There was 70% voters turnout and this was high mark compared to the previous elections held.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ Brillantes, Alex "The Philippines in 1992. Ready for Take-Off?", Asian Survey, Vol.XXXIII, No. 2, February 1993, p.225.

IV. THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

A. THE NATIONAL UNIFICATION COMMISSION (NUC)

President Fidel Ramos in his first State of the Nation address on July 27, 1992, emphasized that the advancement of peace and reconciliation shall be among the priorities of his administration. In pursuit of this agenda, he signed Executive Order No. 19 on September 1, 1992 creating the National Unification Commission (NUC).¹²⁰ The NUC is an ad hoc advisory body to the President tasked to "formulate and recommend, after consulting with the concerned sectors of society, to the President... a viable general amnesty and peace process that will lead to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the country."¹²¹

Ms. Haydee Yorac was designated by President Ramos as the Chairperson of the nine-member NUC.¹²² The other members of the Commission were: Bishop Fernando R. Capalla, Vice-Chairman, Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, Senator Wigberto E. Tanada, Congressman Jose W. Yap, Congressman Eduardo R. Ermita, Secretary Renato S. De Villa, Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, and Dr. Feliciano V. Carino. The NUC is represented by members of the executive branch, legislative branch and the non-government sectors. EO No. 19 also provided for a Council of Advisers which shall serve as a consultative body on the peace process and shall be composed of members to be designated by the President upon recommendation of the NUC.

¹²⁰ Executive Order No. 19. Constituting the National Unification Commission, Prescribing the Authority and Functions and Other Purposes, September 1, 1993; *Brilliantes*. op. cit., p.226.

¹²¹ *Ibid*.

¹²² *Brilliantes*. op. cit., p.226.

In its task of consultation and dialogue towards the formulation of a national peace program, the NUC is guided by the following principles:¹²³

1. A national peace program should present a peace vision and process that is community based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos. Thus, it shall not be defined not by government alone, nor by the different contending armed groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.
2. A national peace program seeks to forge a new social compact for just, equitable, humane and pluralistic society.

It seeks to establish a genuinely pluralistic political society, where all individuals and groups are free to engage in peaceful competition for predominance of their political programs without fear, through the exercise of rights and liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and where they may compete for political power through an electoral system that is free, fair and honest.

3. A national peace program that seeks a principled and peaceful resolution of the armed conflicts, with neither blame or surrender, but with dignity of all concerned.

Guided by these principles, the NUC is tasked to undertake the following:¹²⁴

1. Conduct of informal exploratory discussions with representatives of armed rebel groups.
2. Promulgation of guidelines for the conduct of peace initiative by public officials.
3. Conduct of national and local level consultations.

¹²³ The National Unification Commission and the Peace Process, NUC Secretariat, Quezon City, Philippines, 1993.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

4. Support of confidence-building measures undertaken by government.

B. THE INTERIM PEACE AGREEMENT

After the exploratory and informal meetings with Ms. Yorac and some confidence-building efforts by the government, such as the gradual release of some detainees, suspension of the trial of certain cases, and cessation of hostile activities, the RAM/SFP/YOU leadership, rewarding the public clamor to give peace another chance and searching for other means to attain its goals and aspirations, signed the Interim Peace Agreement with the Government on December 23, 1992.¹²⁵ The agreement was signed by Defense Secretary Renato de Villa for the Government, and Commodore Domingo Calajate, Col. Gregorio Honasan and Capt. Danilo Lim for the RAM/SFP/YOU.¹²⁶ The preliminary accord covered the following:¹²⁷

1. There shall be immediate and complete cessation of hostilities between the parties (including supporters). Such cessation of hostilities shall cover all other acts short of armed activities which can be considered as hostile, like surveillance, special operations, arrests, recruitment, and any act or activity that can be considered as destabilization.
2. The government shall suspend all court martial proceedings, and take steps to secure the suspension of judicial proceedings, including service of warrants, preliminary investigations and the like.
3. Cessation of hostilities and the suspension of the offer of reward money shall be in force for the duration of this agreement and the formal talks.

¹²⁵ Preliminary Agreement dated December 23, 1993.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

4. The parties shall form their respective negotiating panels, finalize their talking points on January 11, 1993 and commence formal talks thereafter.
5. Both parties shall operate consistently within the framework of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

The interim peace agreement was the first significant step by the Government and the RAM/SFP/YOU in an effort to attain a just, honorable and lasting peace. Both parties pledged to exert utmost to come to a just settlement for the benefit of the country and to the Filipino people.

C. RAM'S FIVE TALKING POINTS

The Movement's Talking Points of 1993 were essentially the same as the Eight Talking Points an 1991 that were submitted to then President Aquino except that the issues on military bases, on Marcos, and on the national dialogue were deleted.

The bases affair had been decided by the people and that of the Marcos has become more of a matter between the government and the Marcos family, while the on-going peace process substantially addresses the call for national dialogue of all contending forces. The remaining five issues centered on: good government, electoral reforms, social reforms, economic reforms and military and security reforms. The RAM/SFP/YOU submitted to the Government panel their listing of minimum programs in support to these talking points as shown in APPENDIX. PROGRAMS.

The 1993 Talking points are as follows:¹²⁸

1. Attainment of a Good, Honest, Pro-People, and Efficient Government for National Renewal and Transformation.

The RAM/SFP/YOU argues that the Filipinos have been led to believe in several political and socio-economic myths which have since become ingrained in our society as sound tenets but which are in reality only assumptions.

One of these is that political leadership is a birthright of the economic and intellectual elite.

Consequently, in our so-called representative democracy, an elite minority has come to control all our political and economic fortunes and has unilaterally decided what is supposed to be best for the country. This spawned the politics of patronage and over-centralization of power and authority.

This in turn led to a bloated, inefficient and graft-ridden bureaucracy; over-dependence on government and the resultant over-commitment of, and strain on public resources; and serious anomalies in the relationships between the people, sectoral groups and government.

Big government dominated by the elite governed on a borrowed fallacy that what is good for the elite must be good for the country. This scandalous relationship has perpetuated a political culture which allows the broad masses of people the periodic circuses of elections and other political processes and the often superficial but isolated attempts at solving the country's ills, waged as small wars to be won by proper strategy and tactics and the complement of either incompetent well-meaning or competent but empire building public functionaries. Thus, the war on poverty, the war on

¹²⁸ The National Unification Commission and Peace Process, NUC Secretariat, Quezon City, Philippines, 1993.

drug abuse, the war on criminality, the campaign to rid the armed services of scalawags, and media word wars. Amidst these spectacles, people's expectations continued to grow. The government then, because of the same political culture, tended to excel at proclaiming worthy goals but shunned setting standards of accountability and obligation. This became necessary to perpetuate the politicians' hold on power and for the elite to continue to protect its own interest and its members who may have transgressed even their own laws. It is therefore obvious that fundamental structural and behavioral changes are necessary all around.

Change must however start with the government. We need a government with the political will, capacity and capability of governance; one which can lead and be able to make and enforce fundamental policy decisions to enable it to serve and protect the people and promote the general welfare. Governance requires the ability to deliver basic services and the creation of an environment in which our people may "build a just and humane society" and secure for themselves "the blessings of independence and democracy," not one which exists only for the elite and pays lip service to genuine democracy and the so-called "people empowerment."

The changes are bound to be excruciatingly painful precisely because our politics remain beholden to domestic and foreign interests and the bureaucracy has long been inure to the basics of public service.

A start could be made, so that we may eventually have a government for national renewal and transformation, one which shall provide the institutional base for economic recovery, moral regeneration and a professional bureaucracy in the civil foreign and military services providing the continuity for the implementation of fundamental policies and the bulwark against the vagaries and excesses of politics.

2. Implementation of Electoral Reforms to ensure Clean, Honest, Orderly, and Free Elections.

The Movement believes that elections are among the political processes which are essential in a democracy. Properly exercised, the right of suffrage is the most positive manifestation of the principle that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Perverted, the process becomes the contrived way by which an elite minority legitimizes political dominion over the broad masses and more often than not, perpetuates the socio-economic inequities that our people must get rid of. There is therefore a compelling need to democratize the process so that the opportunity for peaceful access to political power would in reality be available to all. Concomitantly, the need for more safeguards and structural reform in the electoral process is necessary so that the opportunity, when made available, would not be frustrated by machinations so often perpetrated by the same elites who have kept our country in political and socio-economic bondage in collaboration with their local and foreign cohorts.

3. Implementation of Nationalist Economic Development Policies and Programs.

They aver that we are a nation in deep economic crisis. We have an economy which cannot generate jobs nor provide the essential goods and services required by a sizable and expanding population. Thus, the cream of our labor force is impelled to seek employment in foreign lands, many under conditions of virtual slavery. We even import rice, matches, and a whole range of products which could be produced domestically. We have an inefficient agricultural sector which is likewise retreating rapidly. The economy functions primarily as a source of raw materials and cheap labor for

transnational enterprise and a dumping ground for foreign products. We are mired in debts which we can never hope to pay but which continue to sap the nations vitality and its resources.

Yet, we are a nation blessed with abundant human and natural resources. When then does the fundamental problem lie? We have remained stagnant and have in fact been retrogressing relative to our neighbors in Asia because we have not attained economic independence even as we gained the trappings of political independence. The colonial economic and social systems and structures largely remained and were readily transposed into the more invidious forms of neo-colonialism. The political, economic and social inequities which are the results of these must be addressed so that the economy could be made to grow. The factors of production and the fruits of growth must be equally redistributed. We cannot continue to insist on making the elite sectors of our society better off, when it means making the broader masses of our people worse off. For that is where we really are right now. We peg the price standards on basic staples and cereals to protect urban consumers at the cost of the agricultural sector. We continue to hold down labor's share of fruits of production to protect a manufacturing sector which refuses to be more efficient and insist on get-rich-quick export oriented industries. We have given up what could be our greatest patrimony to foreign producers and their local partners, our domestic market.

It is therefore easy to see that the priority task is to arrest the economic crisis to lay the foundations for sustainable development. This would require a complete reversal of current government policies in several areas of the economy and modification of others elsewhere. Some of these policies and their concomitant programs need to be implemented immediately to effect real redistribution of wealth and raise incomes of the majority of our people and

support our vast local market. Others shall be implemented in a deliberate transformative process that should not fall prey to the perfidies of national politics to lead us to sustainable growth and development.

The main policy thrust of government should aim at full control of the domestic market and resources, encouragement of and even direct intervention in setting up the basic industries, capital formation and expansion of investments all to be expressed in an integrated national development plan which shall be the economic blueprint.

4. Actualization of social justice programs to positively address poverty, unemployment, and criminality.

Social justice programs of governments everywhere almost always aim to remove social, economic and cultural inequities; protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, and generally, promote total human liberation and development. Government is expected to ensure that the national economy progresses and then to ensure that the wealth accumulated is used and distributed in socially accepted ways. Constitutional provisions, laws and programs thus provided for our broad masses. The movement's leaders opine that these were all good and heart warming, but all suffer from one basic flaw that is, they were never implemented. This is so because our politics are incompatible with the attainment of social justice. For one, the elite which exercises the political and economic power are not usually benevolent, witness the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and Hacienda Luisita. For another, politicians must always pander to the electorate's expectations, even if such expectations cannot be justified or even when attempts to satisfy those result into more strain on government resources or unleashes more social ills. This does not however mean that social justice must take back seat to political reform and economic recovery. Rather,

in the context of the structural approaches we have already prescribed, progress in social justice can accompany advances in the two other aspects of our national life in such a manner where contradictions can be blunted if not removed altogether.

In prescribing good government as the cornerstone of their position on political reforms, they indicated the democratization of our political process and delivery of basic services would eventually lead to true political independence and democracy which will allow our people to really engineer our own social and industrial revolution.

In the economic arena, rural development and industrialization with social costs considered would eventually result in the alleviation of poverty through better incomes for rural communities and labor. Political democratization loses its integrity unless the people also attain economic independence. Attainment of both will then allow the people a measure of dignity and quality of life which is the true measure of economic development.

A minimum program therefore to actualize social justice should address the social impacts of poverty, the equal access by all sectors of society to basic services and opportunities for upward mobility, the removal of basic injustices from society and the assurance of and protection of human rights and dignity. Clearly, fundamental policy and structural changes are also necessary here.

Our general welfare and well being as a people must proceed from a consensus that not all expectations can be met, that we must think of sharing the responsibilities for our future and that the country can only move forward if our leaders and our citizens take more responsibility for their actions and accept that some societal expectations can be temporarily given less attention in favor of more compelling ones. Critical in determining whether people can escape poverty is what they do for themselves. Critical likewise in

ensuring that the justice system prevails and human rights to include the rights of women, children and cultural minorities are enhanced, is responsible people mobilization and a redefinition of relationships between ourselves, our organizations and the government.

5. Review and realignment of national defense and security concerns to attune these with our fundamental requirements and aspirations.

The military has traditionally been classified as an instrument of political power. As such, it has often been misunderstood. In its classical employment, armies were deemed primarily responsible for protecting the State and guarding and securing the institutions and sacred values of society. As such, it should be ideally be isolated from day to day problems in governnnance; its functions only to be invoked in times of national crises. Because of these definitions, the military establishment is distinguished from all other institutions in society. Because of its unique functions, its claim on resources and impacts on the rest of national policy are often sources of conflict. Military expenditure often means sacrificing in some other socio-economic requirement. The military affects the lives of those who serve in it as well as those whom it must serve. It affects politics and politicians. It affects national decision making and many of our social options.

The RAM/SFP/YOU states that if we all continue to believe that a military establishment, even a modest one, is anecessary appendage in our existence as a nation, then the important questions which a national consensus must answer is how the military is to be shaped, employed and controlled. Heretofore, people outside the military establishment have not really bothered to take the trouble to understand nor positively address these questions. The prevailing sentiment

seemed to be why take the trouble to understand what is so easy to condemn? They contend that if the military is to be employed properly and controlled intelligently, its capabilities and limitations as well as its aspirations must be understood by people inside and outside the establishment.

This is particularly relevant in recent times and for posterity. Militarization and military intervention are repugnant by-words in current usage. The existing Constitution is full of prescriptions on how to control the military through many provisions which betray and institutionalize both an ignorance of and bias against the military. For example, the military is mandated to protect the State and the people but we avoid the fact and oftentimes refuse to accept the fact that protecting and securing can only be accomplished by inflicting and threatening to inflict death and destruction on those who seek to destroy the State and harm our people. Granted that this may in fact be an accurate expression of our people's consensus and will on the military, then it becomes more imperative to undertake fundamental changes in this institution, to allay the fears and to make the military in reality the true protector of the State and the people, not the instrument by which the ruling elites or sectors thereof may perpetuate the political, economic and social ills we all seek to extirpate from our society.

V. GOVERNMENT COUNTERMOVES AND NEGOTIATION STRATEGY

A. BASIC NEGOTIATION GUIDELINES AND FRAMEWORK

In the conduct of the peace talks, the government panel must adhere to the following guidelines or negotiation framework:

1. All dealings and agreements to be reached with the RAM/SFP/YOU panel must be within the Philippine constitutional framework.
2. Under no circumstance the Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be compromised. They are non-negotiable.
3. The government negotiating panel should not threat the RAM/SFP/YOU as a governing political entity exercising jurisdiction over a specific territory. Neither they should be considered as representative of the Filipino people.
4. The government panel must always show the sincerity of its purpose in seeking a just, peaceful and meaningful solution to the military rebels' cause.
5. No foreigner, individual or group, will be allowed to participate in the conduct of the peace negotiations.
6. Various concerned sectors of society must participate in the peace process, directly or indirectly, to give expression to the collective will of the people.
7. The government peace effort should not be taken as a sign of weakness. Although the government remains on top of the situation, it prefers a negotiated settlement with the military rebels.
8. In seeking a negotiated settlement with the military rebels, the government's primary concern is the immediate restoration of just and meaningful peace, national reconciliation and unity as preconditions to economic progress and prosperity.
9. The agreements to be reached must be binding to the government as well as the RAM/SFP/YOU and all their organs and instrumentalities.

B. GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

The government panel must take the following positions on issues/demands that the RAM/SFP/YOU has raised:

<u>Issues/Demands</u>	<u>Government Position</u>
Good Government	
1. Initiation of policy changes in public administration and structural reforms.	Acceptable. This is a continuing government concern.
2. Eradication of graft and corruption in government.	Acceptable. It is part of government program.
3. Return to the fundamental values in public offices.	Acceptable. This is a continuing government concern.
4. Delivery of basic services.	Acceptable. This is part of government program conducted based on priority due to inadequate gov't resources.
Electoral Reforms	
1. Democratization of elections.	Acceptable subject to legislative measure that Congress may enact.
2. Implementation of structural reforms at the Commission of Elections (COMELEC).	Acceptable subject to legislative measure that Congress may enact.
3. Initiation of procedural reforms.	Acceptable. This is a continuing government concern.

Economic Reforms

Adoption of nationalist economic policies and programs in the following areas; fiscal and monetary, investment, industrial, commerce and trade, agricultural and natural resources, services and technology policies and cooperativism.

Acceptable but based on the final recommendation of impartial experts and technical people who have jurisdiction on the respective areas of interests.

Social Reforms

1. Actualization of the agrarian reform program.

Acceptable subject to legislative measures that Congress may enact.

2. Prioritization of the primary health care program.

Acceptable.

3. Provision for free primary and secondary education in public schools.

Acceptable.

4. Administration of social programs.

Acceptable.

5. Pro-labor reforms

a. Higher wages

Acceptable subject to market forces.

b. Improvement of the judicial and quasi-judicial settlement of labor cases and labor problems.

Acceptable subject to legislative measure that Congress may enact.

6. Overhaul criminal justice system.

Acceptable. This is a continuing government program.

7. Initiate programs to enhance and promote human dignity.

Acceptable. This is a continuing government program.

Security and Military Reforms

1. Restructure national defense concepts, doctrines and organizations.

2. Restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces.

3. Instill professionalism and eliminate graft in the Armed Forces.

Acceptable subject to legislative measures that Congress may enact.

Acceptable, although this is a continuing process in the Armed Forces.

No need to discuss. As a matter of policy, the Armed Forces does not tolerate nor countenance military scalawags.

C. GOVERNMENT COUNTERISSUES AND COUNTERDEMANDS

The government panel should not assume strictly passive posture; if the situation demands, it must take aggressive stance, turning the table against the RAM/SFP/YOU especially when it becomes palpably clear that the other side is just using the peace negotiation as a springboard for its propaganda assault.

Accordingly, the government panel should ask the RAM/SFP/YOU to:

1. Abandon the use of arms in seeking government reforms.¹²⁹ Instead, try to attain the RAM/SFP/YOU dreams and visions through legal and peaceful means.
2. Surrender their firearms, specifically the offensive weapons in their possession i.e. Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW). The RAM had at least 40 LAW's, nine of which were ceremoniously turned over to the

¹²⁹ "Rebel boss, 14 others get amnesty," Philippine News, 7-13 December 1994, p.7.

government.¹³⁰

3. Help in the common task of promoting national reconciliation and unity to expedite economic recovery.¹³¹

D. NEGOTIATION STRATEGY

1. Role of the Government

What is the Government's approach towards the attainment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace? Executive Order No. 125 mandates that the government's comprehensive peace efforts shall be pursued along the "Six Paths to Peace" as recommended by the NUC on the basis of its consultations.¹³²

The First Path is the pursuit of social, economic and political reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of the internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation, or even constitutional amendments.

The Second Path is consensus-building and empowerment for peace. This component includes continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus on the peace and reform agenda, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace process.

¹³⁰ "The Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa," BusinessWorld, May 11, 1994, p.1; "Gringo still undecided on running for Senate," Manila Standard, August 26, 1994, p.2.

¹³¹ "RAM, gov't panel agree to speed up peace negotiations," BusinessWorld, July 28, 1994, p.10; "Gov't appeals to RAM," Manila Bulletin, January 21, 1994, p.1; "RAM rebs hit for delaying peace gab," Philippine Times Journal, January 21, 1994, p.6.

¹³² "Toward a Just, Comprehensive and Lasting Peace," Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 1993, pp.15-17.

The Third Path is the pursuit of peaceful negotiated settlement with the different rebel groups. This involves the vigorous efforts toward the completion of exploratory talks, the holding of formal peace negotiations, and the achievement of a final negotiated peace settlement with each of the rebel groups.

The Fourth Path is the implementation of programs for reconciliation, reintegration to mainstream society, and, rehabilitation. These include amnesty and other measures to respond to concerns for legal status and security, and community-based assistance programs to address the economic, social and psychological rehabilitation needs of former rebels, demobilized combatants, and civilian victims of the internal armed conflicts.

The Fifth Path seeks to ensure the welfare and protection of civilians, and to reduce the impact of the armed conflicts on them, recognizing the possibility of continuing hostilities even as peace is pursued by the ways of peace. These include the strict implementation of laws and policy guidelines for the protection of human rights, limited suspension of offensive military operations where possible, intensified delivery of basic services to conflict areas, and recognition of Peace Zones as agreed upon by concerned sectors of the community.

The Sixth and Final Path seeks to build, nurture and enhance a positive climate of peace. These include continued confidence-building measures between government and the rebel groups, and peace advocacy and education within the rest of society.

These six paths to peace are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Therefore, these must be pursued simultaneously, with equal vigor and determination, in order to achieve a just, comprehensive and lasting peace.

2. Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

The military establishment must maintain a low-profile posture in the negotiation processes, but must remain firm and decisive in dealing with the military rebels.

The AFP must adhere strictly to the provisions laid out in the Preliminary Agreement between the Government and the RAM/SFP/YOU i.e. cessation of hostilities , suspension of court martial proceedings, judicial proceedings and reward money.¹³³

Discipline and proper behavior are crucial at this point. The government should not give chance to the military rebels to hurl charges of violations of the agreement against the AFP.

3. Duration

The government should not allow the formal peace negotiations to drag inconclusively over a long period of time. Limit it to one year, to be extended by three more months if necessary, or a total of fifteen months. Prolonged negotiation period will give the RAM/SFP/YOU more precious time for unhampered propaganda exposure. Further, the stability of the country will be at stake and the implementation of the developmental plans will be affected.¹³⁴

4. Participants

Participants must be strictly limited to accredited members of the government and the RAM/SFP/YOU panels. No foreign nationals or organizations should be allowed to participate in the negotiation.

¹³³ Preliminary Agreement dated December 23, 1993.

¹³⁴ "Gov't panel appeals to RAM," Manila Bulletin, January 21, 1994, p.1; "RAM rebs hit for delaying peace gab," Philippine Times Journal, January 21, 1994, p.6.

5. Media Coverage

There should be a pooled media coverage to minimize undue stress on the negotiators. Press releases/press conferences and media interviews must be jointly conducted based on mutually agreed guidelines.

6. Other Suggested Government Countermoves

a. Release deserving military detainees/prisoners as manifestation of the government's sincerity.¹³⁵

b. Pursue the implementation of an unconditional amnesty program mainly addressed to the top and middle leadership and the RAM/SFP/YOU rank and file.¹³⁶

c. In framing the agenda for discussion during the projected talks, avoid vague generalities. Insist on being specific to avoid ambiguities that can be subsequently exploited for disinformation purposes.

d. During the peace negotiations, give no chance to the other side to delay the proceedings. Aim for decisive results within the shortest possible time.

¹³⁵ "RAM asked to resume peace talks," Malaya, January 21, 1994, p.2.

¹³⁶ "Rebel boss, 14 others get amnesty," Philippine News, 7-13 December 1994, p.7; "RAM still rejects edicts on amnesty for rebels," Manila Chronicle, May 18, 1994, p.10; "RAM leaders say amnesty should be unconditional," Today, May 18, 1994, p.5.

VI. COUNTERMEASURES EMPLOYED BY OTHER COUNTRIES

As in the Philippines, peace agreements in other countries are being forged as the role of peace and order in economic development can never be set aside.

In Mexico, for instance, peace negotiations initiated by President Carlos Salinas with the Zapatista National Liberation Army finally gained ground when the group composed of Maya Indian rebels agreed to sit down for a peace settlement with the government.

Desperate to continue improving its public image in the wake of the change given by the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico saw the need to end the hostilities fast. "Repression gives a resonance that echoes to the whole world," one public official said.

The Zapatistas, composed of around 2,000 descendants of the ancient Maya civilization, gave Mexico its most horrifying nightmare when they launched a peasant uprising on New Year's eve in 1993, which victimized the stock market and sent in investment running.

As if on cue, Mr. Salinas offered peace talks, a ceasefire and general amnesty, like a father would offer his crying child candies. It turned out, however, the Zapatistas did not just aspire for indigenous rights. Mr. Salinas would have to address his country's growing poverty, unequal distribution of wealth, corruption in Government and rampant human rights violations.

Similarly, in 1992, the United Nations had to help in order for the Government of El Salvador to forge peace settlement with the Marti National Liberation Front to end the armed struggle that caused the death of at least 75,000 people. The end of the twelve years of strife gave birth to a revitalized economy.

Peru's 14 years of insurgency offers no difference in terms of effects, judging from the economic slump it now suffers. However, a different means was employed for the same end of an economic take-off.

Seen as a good sign, Shining Path, a Maoist group aiming for a peasant-worker state, celebrated its 14th anniversary recently without its trademark of violence. This shows the government's claims that violence is down may be true.

Still, President Alberto Fujimori does not have a peaceful settlement in his mind and promised his countrymen a counterinsurgency plan in the mold of Vietnam. He was quoted as saying, "My Government is determined to completely defeat the Shining Path out of its stronghold."¹³⁷ He vowed to finish off the Shining Path's more than a decade of revolt by combat before his term ends in 1995. In 1994, rebel forces should have been restricted to only small corner in the country. Mr. Fujimori appears to be succeeding but only after more than 27,000 deaths and at least \$22 billion in property damage.

The lessons of Mexico, El Salvador and Peru teach the country's peacemakers that, first, violence is expensive, and second, peace is something man must toil for. Mexico's experience showed the problem of insurgency must never be swept under the rug in an effort to look good to investors and that peace is the first thing needed in order to keep new investments coming.

Also, political armed struggle needs the integrity of negotiations for settlement if a lasting peace is to be attained. The idea of addressing the root causes of armed struggle, no matter how obnoxious to the Government, must be done. Economic development soon follows.

¹³⁷ "Violence is expensive: peace must be toiled for," BusinessWorld, May 12, 1994, p.1.

Ambassador Manuel Yan, chairman of the government panel with the Muslim rebels and the concurrent Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, said peace efforts by the Government should be seen in the light of our economic take-off.¹³⁸ He further stated, "The peace process is the principal cornerstone of the Ramos Administration. It is necessary to arrive at the objective of Philippine 2000."¹³⁹ The city of Manila, which was turned into a war zone during the series of coups launched in the 1980's, will benefit from the peaceful environment resulting from the peace talks. Ambassador Yan averred, "This will help give a better life for our people. There are many foreign investors and capitalists who are eager to give their funds in terms of investments in the Philippines. Full development cannot be brought about as long as there is violence."¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ "Ramos orders gov't panels to step up negotiations with rebel groups," BusinessWorld, March 22, 1994, p.12; "Toward a Just, Comprehensive and Lasting Peace," Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, 1993, p.3.

¹³⁹ "Violence is expensive: peace must be toiled for," BusinessWorld, May 12, 1994, p.1.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

VII. CONCLUSION

The government initiated peace process with the RAM/SFP/YOU comes at a most opportune time; the advent of a new administration traditionally raises renewed hope for meaningful changes in the conduct of national affairs; militarily and politically, the military rebel capabilities have been greatly reduced as the result of the government's reconciliation efforts.

There have already been many efforts exerted by the RAM/SFP/YOU and Government panels in order to establish a favorable climate for peace through negotiated settlement.

Likewise, it is very apparent that the contending forces have similar issues of concern: they share the same concern for the welfare of the Filipino people; the reforms they seek are almost the same too; and they have expressed a desire to pursue a peace process.¹⁴¹ Thus, there is a basis for unity and agreements.

The pursuit for peace is a difficult task. Peace does not only mean the silence of the guns. It shall be realized only by eradicating the reasons why some of the Filipino people have resorted to the gun to redress their grievances. Further, the contending parties should also see to it that whatever agreements made, they should be strictly implemented.

There are many paths to peace and a variety of approaches to the grave issues of conflict and violence that confront the nation. And yet, only the confidence and trust of both parties generate by their respective actions can truly lay the foundations for a just settlement of the most visible and

¹⁴¹ "RAM, gov't panel agree to speed up peace negotiations," BusinessWorld, July 28, 1994, p.10; "RAM, gov't panel to resume talks at working body level," BusinessWorld, March 28, 1994, p.15; "Ramos orders gov't panels to step up negotiations with rebel groups," BusinessWorld, March 22, 1994, p.12.

enduring signs of conflict. While the peace negotiations are being pursued, there are equally important concerns that must be vigorously pursued. More than 40 per cent of the Philippine population is poor.¹⁴² President Fidel Ramos unveiled his economic plan, "Philippines 2000"¹⁴³ when he assumed the Presidency in June 20, 1992 aimed at improving the Philippine economy.

In dealing with the RAM/SFP/YOU negotiating panel including the men behind it, individual interests and personalities of the persons involved must be put in consideration. For it can be reasonably ascertained that their orientation, position in the movement and commitment to the rebel cause will greatly influence their decision. Thus, giving them leeways for graceful exit and treating them with respect and compassion without rendering violence to their sense of pride and dignity, ideological belief or political convictions will make the government's peace initiative more attractive.

Should the members of the RAM/SFP/YOU negotiating panel remain adamant in their intransigent position and the peace process meets rough sailing, a change in the direction of the government moves and countermoves may yield desirable results. If addressed to the rebel rank and file, such government efforts will demoralize their followers and supporters and push discontented and vacillating military rebels back to the folds of military justice. The government's offer of amnesty

¹⁴² Weissman, Robert. "The politics of economic chaos in the Philippines" Multinational Monitor, Jan-Feb 1994, Vol.15, No.1-2, p.13.

¹⁴³ The "Philippine 2000" is President Fidel Ramos' vision of making the Philippines join the newly industrialized countries (NIC's) by year 2000. It is expected to increase the country's gross national product by 10 per cent by the year 1998, and the national per capita income is expected to increase from \$750 to \$1000 per year.

will greatly enhance its peace effort. Pursued as a unilateral act of magnanimity on the part of the government, the amnesty program can be implemented even without being a part of the peace talks agenda. It will work two ways: improve the government image and, to a great extent, weaken the will to resist of certain sectors of the reformist movement. It must be anticipated, however, that some of those who will avail of the amnesty program will just seek "legal status" so that later on they can move freely while openly working for the movement just the same especially in the field of political struggle.

By and large, during the peace negotiations, the government can offset the disadvantages it is facing by vigorously pursuing the overriding objectives:

1. Attain a just and lasting peace, and hopefully, a permanent solution to the military rebels problem.
2. Or, if this is impossible because of the intansigent position of the top RAM/SFP/YOU leadership, ensure at least an unrepachable moral and psychological victory for the government.

VIII. PROGNOSIS

A. SCENARIOS

Based on the foregoing discussions and findings, the following future shape of events expressed in terms of scenarios are hereby projected together with corresponding recommended government moves and countermoves to protect national interests.

The entire peace process can be conveniently divided into three stages:

Stage I - Exploratory/Pre-Negotiation Period

Stage II - Formal Negotiation Period

Stage III - Post-Negotiation Period

By the end of 1994, the peace process has started the Formal Negotiation Period (Stage II). The main highlights thus far were:

1. In late 1992, NUC Chairperson Yorac held a series of discreet meetings with former Colonel Gregorio Honasan and former Commodore Domingo Calajate, Chairman of the RAM Executive Committee. Through her, the RAM submitted to the NUC the list of Talking Points, as well as the names of its Panel Members and Secretariat.
2. To enable the military rebels to conduct their own consultations, the NUC issued Safe Conduct Passes for those in hiding, as well as passes for the temporary release of BGen. Edgardo Abenina and other detained military rebels designated as Panel Members and Secretariat.
3. On December 23, 1992, the Government and the RAM/SFP/YOU signed a Preliminary Agreement providing for the cessation of hostilities, suspension of courts martial proceedings, judicial proceedings, and reward money, and for the formation of panels to engage in formal talks within the framework of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

4. President Fidel V. Ramos appointed a Government Panel headed by University of the Philippines Law Professor Alfredo Tadiar. The RAM/SFP/YOU Panel is chaired by Brig General Edgardo Abenina.
5. Formal negotiations between the Government and the RAM/SFP/YOU commenced on January 22, 1993. The talks had initially moved slowly because of administrative concerns, including the issue of security for the RAM/SFP/YOU Panel and Secretariat.
6. An agreement on the security arrangements for the military rebels was signed by the Government and the RAM/SFP/YOU Panels. A formal ceremony opening the substantive phase of formal talks was held on June 24, 1993. This means that the talks shall now focus on substantive Talking Points. From this point, the peace process may either fail or succeed as projected in the following scenarios:

- a. Scenario 1

- 1). Developments

This scenario assumes that during the formal negotiations, the RAM/SFP/YOU will take advantage of the negotiation period to ventilate through the media and public fora its grievances against the government, intensify its information campaign, make impossible demands and tie down the government on ticklish politico-military and socio-economic issues. With or without effective government countermoves/counterissues, the RAM/SFP/YOU will scuttle the talks, putting the blame on the government. Peace talks collapse in a flicker, or with a semblance of a "stalemate" over some tough issues. Whichever is the case, the government and the RAM/SFP/YOU will exchange charges and countercharges of dealing in bad faith.

- 2). Probability/Desirability

Since the situation remains fluid and that both the RAM/SFP/YOU and the Government Panels are still in the process of positioning and strengthening their negotiation strategies, it is more probable that Scenario 1

will take place. It is precisely what the RAM/SFP/YOU has in its secret agenda through which the movement hopes to gain strategic victory.

This Scenario as projected is definitely undesirable unless the government can control the situation and blunt the RAM/SFP/YOU self-serving intentions and courses of action.

3). Expected RAM/SFP/YOU Courses of Action

During the post-negotiation period (Stage III), the RAM/SFP/YOU will:

a). Go underground and initiate destabilizing threats to the government.

b). Intensify information campaigns against the government through both local and foreign media.

c). Regroup and strengthen their logistical base support.

4). Recommended Government Countermoves

a). Pursue the peace talks; keep the door open for further peace negotiations with the RAM/SFP/YOU leaders; and

b). Continue the policy of attraction; push through the amnesty offer to all military rebels.

b. Scenario 2

1). Developments

This Scenario is a departure from Scenario 1. It assumes that the peace talks did not bog down. The proceedings continue, but just the same, during the negotiations, the RAM/SFP/YOU will take advantage of the negotiation period to ventilate through the media and public fora its grievances against the government, intensify its information campaign, make impossible demands and tie down the government on ticklish politico-military and socio-economic issues. But compelled either by strong public opinion and/or

by other factors including the common desire to come up with any tangible negotiation result, both panels sign a "lame" agreement, a protocol or a joint declaration deliberately replete with civil but broad, ambiguous generalities which later on will be the cause of renewed hostility between the two sides due to conflicting interpretations of said agreements.

2). Probability/Desirability

The Scenario is considered most probable because in the likely possibility that the negotiations reach an impasse, both panels may seek a face-saving device that will enable them to come out of the negotiation room with a semblance of accomplishment. However, if carefully crafted with adequate safeguards against undue advantage for the RAM/SFP/YOU and possible embarrassment for the government, the Scenario may become tolerable.

3). Expected RAM/SFP/YOU Courses of Action

During the post-negotiation period (Stage III), the RAM/SFP/YOU will:

a). Look for loopholes in the agreement, make its own interpretation, make impossible demands, then blame the government; and

b). Intensify information campaigns against the government through local and foreign media.

4). Recommended Government Countermoves

a). Continue the policy of attraction, pursue the amnesty offer to all military rebels;

b). Intensify campaign on loose firearms, especially the surrender of offensive weapons of the military rebels; and

c). Sustain government information drives on government programs which directly address the military rebel issues and grievances.

c. Scenario 3

This is a variation of Scenario 2 where the peace negotiations take place after reaching a compromise. During the negotiations, the RAM/SFP/YOU will demand a number of concessions. With the government panel hard pressed by the imperatives of national reconciliation, unity, peace and immediate solution to the peace and order problem as prerequisites to economic progress and prosperity, the two panels sign a lopsided agreement allowing the RAM/SFP/YOU to share power in running the government.

2). Probability/Desirability

The Scenario projected is least probable as it may prove untenable under the Constitution. As it is, the Scenario is most undesirable.

3). Expected RAM/SFP/YOU Courses

At the post-negotiation period, the RAM/SFP/YOU will:

a). Emerge triumphant as it gains decisive political victory;

b). Start moving to consolidate the political gains made; intensify organizational work with various sectors of society;

c). Mount non-confrontational propaganda drive to enhance the RAM/SFP/YOU image and the cause it is espousing, and win more supporters/followers; and

d). Temporarily suspend destabilizing moves.

4). Recommended Government Countermoves

This Scenario should not happen in the first place, but assuming it does, among the best possible thing that the government could do under the situation are:

a). Interpret the agreement in support of the constitutional government;

b). Blunt/oppose any RAM/SFP/YOU attempt to subvert the country's democratic processes; strictly enforce all applicable laws against such nefarious end; and

c). Find ways and means to abrogate with sufficient justification the lopsided agreement.

d. Scenario 4

1). Developments

This Scenario is another but highly advantageous variation of Scenario 2 where peace negotiations take place after reaching a compromise. Peace talks proceed smoothly; issues are discussed frankly and dispassionately in the true spirit of brotherhood. Differences are threshed out and ticklish issues are amicably settled based on the principle of give and take. A mutually acceptable agreement is signed, giving the military rebels a graceful exit and certain concessions. The military rebels threat to national stability ends as a new era of peace, national reconciliation and unity is ushered in.

2). Probability/Desirability

This Scenario is desirable but deemed less probable to happen mainly on account of the RAM/SFP/YOU intransigent position. Therefore, herein lies the greatest challenge to the government negotiators; how can they strike a happy compromise that can be mutually acceptable to both sides, a compromise that is constitutional viable, gives justice to all yet adequately provided with safeguards against the ascendancy of the RAM/SFP/YOU through illegal means.

3). Expected RAM/SFP/YOU Courses of Action

During the post-negotiation period (Stage III), the RAM/SFP/YOU will:

a). Abandon its military "adventurisms" and allow its members/followers to become peaceful, law-abiding, productive citizens; and

b). Join the political arena to further espouse their views and allow interested members file their respective candidacies in any elective positions in government.

4). Recommended Government Moves

a). Abide by the provisions of the agreement.

b). Adopt a policy of accomodation to deserving military rebels who opt to be back in the military service.

c). Expedite the processing of military rebels who took advantage of the amnesty program.

d). In line with the true spirit of national reconciliation and unity, start in earnest the forging of new beginnings that will usher in national reconstruction.

The four scenarios discussed above are the alternative results expected to evolve from the peace process. It is possible, however, that unexpected factors may crop up during the peace process and a variant of any of the four scenarios herein presented may result. Such variant is not expected to be a radical departure from the original scenario, hence, the anticipated RAM/SFP/YOU courses of action and the corresponding government countermeasures as projected under said scenario will remain substantially valid although minor adjustments might be necessary.

B. RELATIVE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE

All things considered, the above-cited scenarios are expected in the following descending order of probability of occurrence.

1. Scenario 2

Negotiations come out with a "lame" agreement, a protocol or a joint declaration replete with civil but broad, ambiguous generalities. Process fails after negotiations with both sides charging each other with dealing in bad faith. This Scenario is considered most probable to happen because despite its intransigent position during the pre-negotiation period, the RAM/SFP/YOU will most probably try to sit down with the government panel to conduct peace talks which, irrespective of results, will afford them the broadest opportunity for sustained propaganda assault.

The peace talks are expected to reach an impasse over some tough issues and both panels may seek face-saving device that will enable them to come out with a sense of accomplishment. This will result in the signing of a "lame" agreement, protocol or a joint declaration replete with broad and ambiguous generalities. This is one important lesson learned from the Tripoli Agreement between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Philippine Government.

2. Scenario 1

Negotiations collapse or end up in a "stalemate" over some tough issues. Part of the RAM/SFP/YOU agenda is to exploit to the fullest the peace negotiations to ventilate its talking points, then scuttle the talks, putting the blame on the government.

3. Scenario 4

Peace talks end up with a mutually acceptable agreement; the objectives of the peace process are attained; military rebels problem end. Though highly desirable, this scenario is considered less probable to happen compared to the two preceding Scenarios above. Yet, both sides may somewhat strike a happy compromise that may lead to a mutually acceptable agreement especially if the military rebels adhere to abandon their destabilizing threats and actions.

4. Scenario 3

Negotiations end up with a lopsided agreement allowing the RAM/SFP/YOU to share power in running the government. The arrangement is not expected to stand the political fallout it will create.

This Scenario should not happen in the first place. However, this course of action may yet become probable and tolerable if the agreement to be signed will give the RAM/SFP/YOU constitutionally viable political concessions with full guarantee against the possible political ascendancy of the RAM/SFP/YOU through illegal means.

C. PREFERENTIAL SCENARIOS: MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM

In any negotiations, getting everything that a negotiator wants is an impossibility. When meeting on more or less equal terms with neither side dictating over the other from the position of an undisputedly overwhelming strength, negotiators are expected to assert their positions most tenaciously. They will hold their grounds to protect their respective interests unless they lean back a little to find mutually acceptable alternatives.

In the case of the Philippine government, it must be accepted that the other side it is dealing with; the RAM /SFP/YOU, is still a major force to reckon with, encouraged and abetted by the prevailing social, economic and politico-military environments in the country. Hence, the need of flexibility in dealing with them on the bargaining table based on the following objectives:

1. Maximum objective: attain just, lasting and meaningful peace, national reconciliation and unity.
2. Minimum objective: attain moral and psychological victory irrespective of the negotiation results with adequate safeguards against RAM/SFP/YOU political ascendancy through illegal means.

Based on these considerations, the following are deemed preferential over the other Scenarios discussed above:

1. First Preference: Scenario 4

This Scenario which ends up in a mutually acceptable agreement is the best thing that could happen to the Filipino people, Although rated as least probable, it is nevertheless a most desirable turn of event that could bring the peace process to a successful conclusion. A just, lasting and meaningful peace will be restored with the attainment of national reconciliation and unity.

2. Second Preference: Scenario 2

Although devoid of any concrete result except for a face-saving "lame" agreement, protocol or joint communique replete with ambiguities and broad generalities, the Scenario is deemed more manageable and more tolerable than the remaining two other scenarios. It is neither a complete success nor a total failure, but it would leave a less inhospitable environment for future civil-military and psychological operations. If properly crafted, the arrangement will give the government better chances to effectively pursue its policy of attraction including the amnesty offer to the military rebels.

The Scenario offers a fairly good chance for the government to attain at least the minimum objective of the peace process: to gain moral and psychological victory with adequate safeguards against unlawful ascendancy of the RAM/SFP/YOU.

3. Third Preference: Scenario 1

The third and least preferable is Scenario 1 where the formal peace talks will abruptly collapse or end in a stalemate mainly due to the RAM/SFP/YOU intransigent position. Although the Scenario will not yield the desired results, it will give the government the chance to expose the duplicity and self-serving intentions of the RAM/SFP/YOU. If properly handled, it will allow the government to take appropriate

handled, it will allow the government to take appropriate moves and countermoves to make the moral and psychological gains out of the disadvantaged situation.

APPENDIX. PROGRAMS

RAM'S SUGGESTED PROGRAMS

Talking Point No. 1. The RAM/SFP/YOU suggests that a minimum program should include:

a. Implementation and/or strengthening of the following fundamental policy changes in public administration and the consequent structural reforms these will require.

1). Devolution leading to more people participation and more pro-people policies and/or decentralization of national government functions in the areas of socio-economic development and delivery of basic services along the matrix type or organization.

2). Reorganization of the Executive Branch of government by reducing the number of departments, offices and agencies through the merging of those with overlapping functions and responsibilities, abolition of offices where government intervention is neither necessary nor desirable and the devolution to local government units of selected services.

3). Reorientation of the policy formulation and decision making system particularly in the executive departments with decentralized functions from the present system of direct government regulation to one based on consensus building and coordination.

4). Reorientation of foreign policy to assert sovereignty and pursue vigorously international cooperation in economic and trade relations with other countries.

5). Insulation of the bureaucracy as well as the constitutional bodies from partisan politics by:

a). Requiring that all regular positions in all departments up to undersecretary levels and in all agencies up to Deputy Administrator shall be drawn from the civil service.

b). Removal of the power of the President to appoint heads of constitutional bodies by providing that such bodies elect their head themselves.

6). Gradual reduction of the bureaucracy consistent with the restructuring of the executive departments and offices and agencies over a period of five years through an attrition system which shall include an early retirement program; rescreening and requalification of personnel and retention only of the best qualified; dismissal of grafters, scalawags and non-performers.

7). Revision of the Civil Service Law to include or improve provisions on the following:

a). Review and revision of recruitment, selection and entry processes.

b). Review and revision of the attrition system.

c). Review and revision of the grievance system to include provisions on the right of civil servants to freely organize unions.

8). Professionalization of the civil service through:

a). Improvement to access to higher education and in-service training.

b). Rationalization of the wage structure for public servants to include increase in salaries and benefits for those in the lower levels, prescribing limits on allowances and benefits for those in the higher levels and improvement of non-wage benefits to include subsidize housing, health, education and income tax exemption for public servants with net incomes equal to or below the income poverty line to narrow the gap between salaries and perks of those in high level positions and those in the rank and file.

b. Eradication of graft and corruption in government.

1). The pursuit, prosecution and early resolution of all graft and corruption cases particularly the following:

a). The "behest loans" and the "behest sales" to include not only the contracting parties but also those in government and the government financial institutions who facilitated, participated in attempted cover-up or otherwise took advantage of the circumstances of the behest loans/behest sales for personal benefits.

b). Corruption in government institutions, corporations and agencies to include the Central Bank, Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank, Government Service Insurance System, Social Security System, National Food Authority, Philippine National Railways, Philippine Ports Authority, National Power Corporation, Philippine Charity Sweepstakes and others.

c). Corruption in the revenue generating arms of government particularly the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs and Presidential Commission on Good Government.

2). Institution of systematic reform in:

a). Administration of tax and duty laws.

b). The conduct of all government financial transactions.

c). Government supplies and materials procurement.

d). Construction and maintenance project implementation.

3). Revision and strict implementation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law and Code of Ethics for Public Servants to provide for increased penalties and facilitate detection and prosecution of grafters and non-performers in the service.

4). Improvement of the capability of the Office of the Ombudsman by upgrading staffing quantity and quality and providing for direct links with organic inspectorate capabilities at department level.

c. Return to the fundamental values in public office.

1). Implementation of measures to emphasize that public office is a public trust.

2). Bringing back morality in public service.

3). Government austerity and judicious use of resources.

4). The strict observance of the separation of powers with the power of the purse to be strictly returned to congress.

5). Respect for the rule of law in the conduct of government affairs.

d. Delivery of basic services with government being able to at least give citizens a fair return on their taxes.

1). Solution of the energy problem.

2). Improvement of the capability of local government units through financial support, technical assistance and training to deliver basic services and infrastructure particularly with respect to availability of potable water, primarily health services, garbage disposal, market and produce distribution facilities, protection of life and property, disaster relief and rehabilitation operation, and delivery of basic communications facilities.

Talking Point No. 2. The Movement submits a list of minimum imperatives to move towards the recommended directions:

a. Democratization of elections.

1). An anti-dynasty law must be promulgated and strictly enforced.

2). The party list system of representation should be actualized.

3). Provisions on equal access to media time and facilities to include common posters and leaflets, joint public meetings and regulation of media ads should be institutionalized.

4). Restudy and strict implementation of election expenditure limit provisions to include post-election expense audit should be accomplished.

5). The absentee voting system and enfranchisement of the disabled and the illiterate must be institutionalized to further broaden the electoral base.

b. Implementation of structural reforms.

1). Institute a reject-vote system through which the electorate may exercise a "none of the above" option and hence influence the selection process for candidates; with candidates being thus rejected in any election being subjected to sanctions such as a temporary ban from seeking public office through elections or appointment.

2). Reorganize and strengthen the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to include the appointment to the Commission of qualified citizens with no known history of political partisan or connections with big business; cleansing on the rank and file and the upgrading of physical facilities to include a new and permanent building for the Commission with ample provisions for secure storage of election paraphernalia and similar requirements for the efficient conduct of elections.

c. Institution of safeguards and controls.

1). Improve administration of the voters lists to include the purging and computerization of existing lists in close coordination with the accredited political parties, barangay officials, accredited watchdog organizations and the National Census and Statistics Office; and the continuing registration of all qualified voters as they reach the age of qualification.

2). Institute more stringent safeguards in the sourcing, printing, packing, distribution, use, retrieval and final disposition of all election forms and paraphernalia through representation by all accredited political parties in all activities covering the above with the three largest political parties as determined from the preceding elections being given the right to furnish their own seals and/or security provisions for certificates of canvass and other electoral forms and paraphernalia for the purpose.

3). Institute and strictly implement fixed time limits for the completion of electoral protests and cases of violations of electoral laws, with punitive provisions to be provided against persons or groups which may be found responsible for causing unwarranted delays.

4). Strictly guarantee the neutrality of government personnel and instrumentalities particularly with respect to the clear and enforceable assurance of non-partisan use of government funds, facilities and equipment during the election period. The misuse of government funds in the last elections particularly thr National Reconciliation and Development Project (NRDP) funds should be vigorously investigated and guilty parties prosecuted.

5). Announcements on all election results at whatever stage of polling shall only be by COMELEC.

Talking Point No. 3. The RAM/SFP/YOU avers that an integrated national development plan shall include:

a. Adoption of nationalist economic policies and programs particularly in the areas of:

1). Fiscal and monetary policies:

a). The review and reorientation of the debt management program to include the designation of a full time debt management team composed of personnel who are not beholden to domestic and international banking interests and

imbued with economic nationalism to aggressively pursue restructuring of the commercial bank portion of our national debt; relief, condonation or innovative means of retiring government to government debt; and to review, correct, and stop the treachery behind the debt buy back and debt to equity swaps engineered by local financial moguls and the banking system.

b). Reform the financial system with emphasis on the reorientation of the role of the government financial institutions in development lending and the elimination of banking cartels with the primary objective of easing credit and encouraging capital formation. The interest rate spreads allowed banks should be reviewed to close the gap between lending rates and interest on savings. Anti-trust legislation and other measures to eliminate banking malpractices should also be enacted.

c). The adoption of development budgeting and austerity by the public sector to be complemented by a review of taxation to make it more progressive and make collection more efficient.

d). The arrest of capital flight and the repatriation and/or recovery of capital stashed here and abroad through an amnesty program.

e). Abandon the floating exchange rate, impose foreign controls and peg the exchange rate to a value, say of P30.00 to \$1.00.

2). Investment policies.

a). Foreign investments shall be allowed only in selected areas as specified in the economic blueprint and shall be fully capitalized and sourced from the international market, given reasonable profit repatriation allowances and required to effect real technology transfer at a specified time frame.

b). The roles of government and the private sector in fueling economic growth must be rationalized to eliminate destructive competition for resources, eliminate monopolies and cartels in strategic and essential industries i.e. communications, oil, electric power. The privatization program shall be reviewed so that strategic industries and those imbued with public interest should not be privatized and privatization schemes of other industries are not turned into "sweatheart" deals.

3). Industrial policies.

a). Concentration should be on accelerated development of basic industries and infrastructure to produce our basic needs, produce capital goods and tools, benefit local consumers and generally provide a sound base for industrial expansion.

b). Centrally planned dispersal of industries such as rural development and the use of designated industrial estates shall be encouraged and implemented through providing government technical assistance, tax breaks and other incentives for small and medium scale industries. Industrial estates use by foreign investors shall only be in areas as specified above.

4). Commerce and Trade policies.

a). Import liberalization should be reviewed to stop imports of non-essentials, encourage import substitution, protect deserving local industries, provide access to better technology and ensure benefits for consumers. Instead, import controls hand-in-hand with foreign exchange controls should be imposed.

b). The foreign stranglehold of domestic trade particularly on staples and local produce for export such as coffee and coconut products must be broken to allow primary producers fair price for their products.

c). The development of export markets be restudied. Primary considerations in the development of products for export are the development of processed goods from local raw materials for export rather than products of low added value for which we also import raw materials and whose markets are beyond our control; diversification of products and markets to move away from dependence on too few trading partners and the resultant manipulation of price and quantity; and the exploitation of other synergies in export marketing such as mandatory use of Philippine carriers and other services for export trade.

d). Barter and counter-trade as modes of international trade particularly for government purchases and import of capital goods should be given added official encouragement and acceptance.

5). Agricultural and natural resource policies.

a). The priority tasks in agriculture are to implement genuine agrarian reform and the attainment of self-sufficiency in basic food products and farming inputs through improved technology and productivity to raise rural incomes as a major requirements for industrial development.

b). The exclusive right of Filipinos to exploit the national patrimony must be held inviolable and given added government assistance and protection. Land use, mining, mineral exploitation, fishery, utilization of forest and other natural resources to include those in our exclusive economic zone to include in-country processing of the products from these shall be aggressively pushed through provision of financial and technical assistance.

c). Environmental protection programs shall be balanced with the requirements of development; however, the maintenance of ecological systems in areas already designated as natural preserves and pollution control in urban areas; water and marine resource shall never be compromised.

6). Services and Technology policies.

a). Government support to local innovativeness and ingenuity must be improved with particular encouragement for adaptive technology for technologies where basic research and development is already well developed abroad, and for applied and theoretical science and research on areas unique to our country and for which productive returns can be achieved effectively such as in the areas of herbal and traditional medicine, agronomy and plant breeding.

b). The local services sector should be improved by providing government technical assistance and skills training.

7). Cooperativism.

a). Cooperativism in agriculture and in small and medium scale industries should be pursued with government encouragement and support particularly in forms of facilitating access to credit, technology and market development.

b). Additional incentives for cooperatives must be provided by law.

Talking Point No. 4. The proposed minimum program towards the attainment of social justice is as follows:

a. The poor shall be the primary beneficiaries of social amelioration programs and basic services particularly those which will enhance living standards and the opportunities for advancement through their honest efforts.

1). Agrarian reform must be actualized to ensure that productive elements of the agricultural sector are given genuine liberation and be the nucleus for rural development.

2). Government health programs shall give priority to generally accessible primary health care, responsible parenthood, basic sanitation and nutrition with primary emphasis on eliminating infant mortality and malnutrition and

the provision of socially priced health services and medicines.

3). Quality and free primary and secondary education in public schools should be afforded all our citizens. Secondary and tertiary education should be reoriented towards tailoring the output of our school systems to the human resource requirements of socio-economic development. Physical facilities and the quality of instruction should be improved and the curriculum in all levels of education should give renewed emphasis on civics, the inculcation of proper values and attitudes. Quality education means, the turn-out of critical minds, technical competence and the transference of positive values in lieu of reproducing and reinforcing the old orthodoxies which have largely perpetuated the structures of dominance of the elite.

4). Social amelioration programs should be administered as a package of incentives rather than as dole outs. Shelter and livelihood opportunities shall be made available only to those who are willing to work for these. Tax breaks and other benefits can be extended to the working poor.

b. Labor's share in the fruits of development should be improved.

1). Wage legislation should be limited to setting the realistic basic minimum wages to be the standard which employers must pay on an industry and on a regional basis. On top of the prescribed basic minimum wages, other benefits and opportunities to include profit-sharing, equity participation, non-wage benefits such as food and housing subsidies, health care and other programs may be attained by encouraging and protecting true unionism in which laborers themselves are the active forces.

2). Legislation on the improvements of the judicial and quasi-judicial settlement of labor cases and labor problems must be promulgated to allow their speedy resolution.

3). Labor productivity must be enhanced by requiring employers to provide in-service training, skills enhancement and educational programs.

4). The labor of labor exportation should be reviewed and reformed. Only professions and occupations in which we have excess manpower and those for which overseas employment will result in upgrading of technical knowledge and skills of our workers should be allowed. Recruitment, mobilization, placement and contract administration should be turned over to complete government control to avail of the advantages of government to government transactions, afford maximum protection to our workers and protect the labor pool from unwarranted exploitation. In any case, the export of skilled labor and professionals should be phased out as the national economy attains the capability to absorb the growing labor force.

c. The criminal justice system should be overhauled and reformed.

1). The judicial system should be reformed to remove inefficient and corrupt elements, speed up the implementation of justice and ensure equal application of the law to poor and rich alike. The process of litigation of simple cases can be made faster by provision of a system of people's court in which litigants need not be represented by counsel but are allowed to prosecute or defend their own cases. A system of continuous trial for criminal cases should be implemented. Government should improve the provision of quality free legal aid to indigent litigants.

2). The prosecution arm should also be reformed through improvement of physical facilities and the strict adherence to a code of ethics.

3). Law enforcement must be improved and enhanced. The organizational reform and professionalization of the police agencies must be given priority consideration

particularly in the areas devolving to local government units the responsibility for community peace and order. Improvement of police to population ratios, improvement of police capabilities, and service attitudes and values should be attended to. The top priority should be the removal of misfits and scalawags from the law enforcement agencies and the provision of laws increasing penalties for law enforcers protecting or participating in criminal activities.

4). Penology should give priority attention to the improvement of jail conditions nationwide. The implementation of reform and rehabilitation programs can only prosper if penal conditions are conducive and prisoners are afforded the minimum essentials of human existence.

5). Community participation in the criminal justice system must also positively be addressed. Citizen access to police and legal services must be improved. The witness protection program and other measures to improve citizen participation must be given full support.

6). The major effort to combat criminality must be on the elimination of organized crime particularly drug trafficking, carnapping and kidnapping; and the protection of the lives and property as a minimum.

d. Programs to enhance and promote human dignity and well-being must follow the fundamental policies which are consistent with the requirements of national unity and development.

1). The protection of human rights shall be the primary concern of the state. The Human Rights Commission (HRC) must be given the prosecutory powers and improved investigation capability.

2). Equalization of employment opportunities and removal of discriminatory practices with respect to property and individual rights of women shall be given added emphasis in law and in practice. The protection of women and children

from domestic violence and exploitation in all aspects of national life shall also be pursued vigorously.

3). Cultural minorities and indigenous communities must be given all opportunities to be fully integrated into the national mainstream while ensuring the retention of the positive aspects of indigenous cultures. The question on ancestral lands must be finally settled taking into account a balance between the preservation of the right to life, liberty and happiness of these Filipinos and the requirements of national development.

4). Comprehensive programs to address the problems of mendicancy, street children, drug abuse, prostitution and abandonment of the aged and the handicapped should be formulated and implemented. These shall include the provision of food, clothing and shelter together with programs to rehabilitate these victims of society and return as many of them as is possible to productive life.

5). The preservation and enhancement of indigenous culture must be given renewed emphasis in national life. The vehicles for propagation of culture and art must be reoriented to gear these towards faster attainment of national identity and for these to consciously contribute towards the realization of national aspirations. Use of domestic media and the global information networks in shaping the values of our young shall be monitored to ensure insulation of young minds from invidious propaganda and questionable values.

Talking Point No. 5. RAM/SFP/YOU's minimum program therefore seeks to address the stated concerns. If we do indeed need a military, then it must be one which conforms with our aspirations as a people and one which we can support and identify with. to obtain such military establishment, we must:

a. Review, redirect and restructure national defense concepts, doctrines and organization as follows:

1). Amend the National Defense Act (CA Nr.I) particularly on:

a). National defense policy and organization so that this will be more responsive to current and future needs given the changing domestic and international security milieu.

b). Eliminate or modify provisions which have provided institutional sources of disaffection in the military such as those on rules and procedures on promotion; distinctions between regular and reserve components while in the active service; the relative security of tenure of enlisted personnel in the regular force; personnel administration policies and procedures relative to recruitment, training, assignments and separation from the service; command relationship; and the decision making process in the defense-military organization.

c). Reconcile provisions with the National Service Law and other new laws and issuances such as the Philippine National Police (PNP) Law and the new Revised Administrative Code.

2). Review and revision of national defense concepts and doctrines particularly on providing definitive guidance on military roles in:

a). External defense and security of our territorial areas, exclusive economic zone and contiguous areas.

b). Civil defense operations, rescue, disaster and relief situations.

c). Mobilization of industry and other sectors for defense such as in the area of defense manufacturing and procurement and the military participation in purely civilian enterprises.

d). National development vis-a-vis civilian government agencies and the relation of these to internal stability and security operations.

3). Codification and rationalization of national defense and security laws by using the modified National Defense Act as the basic law and incorporating extant issuances such as those on the National Security Council and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency and new legislation as will properly define crimes against national security.

4). Review and realignment of international defense posture through the review of bilateral and multilateral defense posture and realigning these to give substance to the ASEAN ideal of making the region a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality and new realities.

b. Restructuring and reorganization of the AFP.

1). Reconfiguration into a citizen army built around a relatively small standing modernized army as nucleus - "lean and mean" military organization tailored to existing needs with provisions for the elimination of para-military units, phased programs for modernization and attainment of external defense capability, and integration of elements of former rebel forces and people's militias in the organization.

2). Revision of Command and Staff Organization through adoption of the joint chiefs concept and elimination of multiple and top heavy supervending headquarters levels and the decentralization of operations control and execution back to the primary tactical formations.

3). Formulation and adoption of relevant doctrines to cover all areas of military activities.

a). Continuing update/restudy of existing campaign strategies to make them more comprehensive and relevant.

b). Organizational and equippage doctrines to guide the completion of a rationalized table of organization and equipment and to provide the basis for modernization and weapons systems acquisition.

c). Come up with our own combat and tactical doctrines based on actual local situations and experiences.

c. Professionalization of the Military.

1). Implement and/or modify constitutional provisions on insulation of the military from partisan politics and related provisions.

2). Undertake systematic reforms in key areas of military activity particularly:

a). Personnel administration and management

b). Military Justice System to include revision of the Articles of War

c). AFP financial mangement and service institutions to include audit of existing financial institutions and investments

3). Eliminate graft and corruption particularly in graft ridden areas such as:

a). The procurement system

b). Construction, repair and maintenance

c). Claims and benefits processing.

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